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A Global Monitoring System: Appraising the Effects of Government on Human Dignity

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Policy scientists can contribute to the democratic shaping and sharing of values by promoting and participating in a global monitoring system. Such a system would be designed to appraise policy formulation and execution by major governmental actors on a worldwide basis. The proposed system would be a private, transnational organization (or series of competing organizations) consisting of policy scientists from throughout the world who would use standardized indicators to monitor governmental actions and their impacts on professed official goals and on the attainment and distribution of basic human values. Taken collectively these basic values can be summated as human dignity. Key to the mission of the global monitoring system is its cybernetic nature, i.e., it is continuous, open, visible, and self-correcting. Appraisal is the assessment of institutional performance in terms of policy processes and actual outcomes as compared to avowed goals and the fundamental values associated with human dignity. Appraisal also involves attribution of the responsibility for these policy results. In performing its appraisal mission, the global monitoring system would undertake systematic projections of the probable consequences of current trends in policy. The results of such a continuous monitoring system would be disseminated at periodic intervals to the civic and public orders throughout the world.

PREAMBLE

NEED AND OPPORTUNITY

This article proposes the establishment of a monitoring system designed to involve the continuous appraisal of policy formation and execution by major governmental actors on a

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worldwide basis. The proposed system would be a private (i.e., nongovernmental), transnational organization. It would be composed of policy scientists who would employ standardized procedures to monitor the impact of governmental actions on espoused official goals and on the attainment and distribution of basic human values. Taken collectively, these basic values can be summarized as human dignity. The results of continuous monitoring of these basic human values would be distributed periodically to civic and public sectors throughout the world.

Our proposal is addressed to social scientists and like-minded colleagues in other disciplines who share a policy science orientation and who might wish to contribute to the democratic shaping and sharing of values. We suggest that policy scientists can make a unique contribution by promoting and participating in the kind of global appraisal enterprise we shall describe provisionally in the pages to follow.

We should say at once that there is, obviously, no simple way to reshape contemporary social and political life to better realize the basic values associated with human dignity. We do deem it worthwhile, however, to explore one kind of positive approach to promoting such values as a possible antidote to the grizzly prospects and dire prognostications concerning the future of human dignity on a global basis.[1] Although there is no way to "know the future," any serious policy science consideration of the future ought to increase the possibility of changing the anticipated undesired prospects that might otherwise occur if present conditions and trends were left to their unaltered course. A global network that regularly provided responsible information on the performance of governments with regard to certain basic values would allow the governmental actors themselves (the public sector) and—in at least some societies—individual citizens (the civic sector) to determine whether or

1. The concern for the future of these values has been expressed repeatedly in recent years. For example, a special issue of the journal *The Public Interest* emphasized the danger to democratic values as indicated in Moynihan's (1975: 5) introduction: "Neither liberty nor democracy would seem to be prospering—or, in any event, neither would seem to have a future nearly as auspicious as their past."

not alternative policies should be advocated. Whatever the difficulties encountered in the formulation of alternative strategies of change based on systematic knowledge and information from monitoring, such redirection of government action would not be a leap into the unknown: It would be an attempt to *make* the future, rather than simply to *know* it.

We believe there exists a configuration of circumstances well known to all of us which might be termed an "emergent opportunity" and which we simply note without further comment:

(1) Many critical problems are clearly global in origin or scope.

(2) The age-old concern for the consequences of governance—the exercise of power—is (if anything) heightened and more pervasive today because of concentration, new forms of control, and salience of effects.

(3) The search for more effective problem-solving procedures to cope with complexity can be observed everywhere and knows no national boundaries.

(4) The tools and techniques required for intelligence and appraisal functions have increased in number and utility as a result of research and experience over the past 20 years.

(5) The policy sciences appear to be growing in identity and desirability as a professional activity.[2]

On the basis of the last two items, we assume that at least some of the more important intellectual and technical capabilities for the launching of a global system of political appraisal are at hand.[3] While exploring a way to capitalize on need, opportunity, and available resources, we shall attempt to give

2. For example, see Brewer (1974). The first statement of this orientation is generally agreed to be Lerner and Lasswell (1951).

3. A number of individuals have contributed to endeavors that might make such a capability possible, and they have called for the creation of systems that resemble to greater or lesser degrees the proposal advanced here. References to some of these efforts appear later in this essay.

due recognition to difficulties the reader will naturally anticipate.

BASIC VALUES AND HUMAN DIGNITY

The global monitoring facility we propose would have as its subject of inquiry the actual distribution of value indulgences (a positive gain or avoided loss) and value deprivations (a positive loss or blocked gain) among the actors and populations affected. The ultimate domain of the monitoring system would be all those political jurisdictions (subnational, national, and transnational) and their attendant policy processes whose decisions, implementative activities, and eventual impacts on social reality determine the actual distribution of both value indulgences and deprivations.

Not only would the focus be on the distribution of value outcomes, but it would also be on the relationship between current indulgences and deprivations—their balance, as it were—*and* on the relationship between value accumulation and value enjoyment. The former refers to the use of a value to obtain more of it; the latter refers to the potential use of value to obtain other (and different) values. In addition to the distribution of balances involving indulgences, deprivations, accumulation, and enjoyment, it is important to include an estimate of "gross value outcome" (i.e., the sum of indulgences) and of "net value income" (i.e., the sum of indulgences when deprivations are deducted). Furthermore, attention to both preparatory events (value shaping) and outcome events (value sharing) is required because appraisal would include an analysis of the relationship between them. Of great importance are the flow of outcome events and changes in priorities through selected time periods.

It seems convenient in this context to let the term value refer to a set of eight categories which some of us have found useful: power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skills, affection, rectitude, and respect, and to bear in mind the eight value-

institutional structures that specialize in these value functions.[4] One advantage of this schema is that it is relatively easy to establish "equivalencies" (or correspondence) between its terms and those of other schemata which employ different vocabularies. Moreover, we propose that the value "power" be the keystone of any approach to global monitoring of governmental performance, a decision which hardly needs justification to this audience. It is obvious that the exercise of power exerts strong and often decisive influence on the other seven values.

If we were to assign an overarching purpose to the monitoring strategy being advanced here, it would be to enhance significantly the aspiration for universal human dignity. By human dignity we mean a summative symbol for the preferred states of being associated with the eight basic values listed above. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights presents another formulation of the basic values that we identify collectively as human dignity. It is not just the aspiration for the universal distribution of the values associated with human dignity, but the effective realization and the actual distribution of these values among all people, that is of concern.

FUNCTIONS AND GOALS OF MONITORING

We envisage a cluster of interrelated functions and goals for the proposed global monitoring system, with the promotion of

4. The particular terms used in the classification of values are not the important point, but, rather, the equivalency of the concepts is. With respect to these eight values a brief elaboration would be as follows:

power–participation in decision making
respect–honor, status, prestige, recognition
rectitude–virtue, goodness, righteousness
affection–love, friendship, loyalty
wealth–income, goods, services
well-being–health, safety, comfort
skills–proficiency in any practice
enlightenment–knowledge, insight, information

For a fuller discussion of this classification of values, see Lasswell (1963, 1971), Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), and Brewer and Brunner (1975).

human dignity as its ultimate concern. First, the appraisal of governments would embrace policy processes and their relationship to intended policy outcomes, as well as the actual impact of policies, programs, and actions on values and their distribution. Put more succinctly, monitoring would focus on the familiar trilogy of policy formation, implementation, and outcomes. Appraisal would highlight probable causes of and assign responsibility for value outcomes. Moreover, global institutional appraisal of political actions, broadly defined, would help to identify and evaluate alternative patterns of participation in value shaping and sharing and alternative modes for the functioning of institutional structures (i.e., policy processes). Our interest in institutions is fundamentally guided by the assessment of their role in the invention, diffusion, and restriction of values and value outcomes.

A second function of global monitoring would be the more intensive stimulation and testing of explanatory and prescriptive theories. This function has a dual aspect as we see it. On the one hand, existing theories that appear to embody forecasts relevant to policy formation and execution could be subject to more frequent and systematic checks against the continuous flow of events. On the other hand, a comprehensive appraisal strategy would encourage the construction of new forecast-oriented and problem-oriented theories.

The goals of a global monitoring system can be viewed in terms of the system's impact on three groups:

A. Political Leaders (including those in governments, ruling political parties, influential political elites, military junta, effective political opposition parties, and major international organizations):

(1) To increase political leaders' awareness of and sensitivity to the conditions of citizens in their society with respect to professed national goals and basic values.

(2) To provide political leaders with systematic information about the probable effects their previous and future actions will have on professed goals and basic values.

(3) To encourage innovation by political leaders in both future policies and their own appraisal routines.

B. Citizens (individuals governed by a particular political jurisdiction, including national authority):

(1) To encourage public consideration of the acceptability of their political leaders' value priorities, their leaders' level of demonstrated commitment to these priorities, and the degree to which values are attained and equitably distributed.

(2) To increase citizens' awareness of the variation in indulgences and deprivations of basic values that they experience relative to others and to allow them to see their situations in a comparative global context.

(3) To promote public commitment to continuous appraisal in every political jurisdiction at all administrative levels and within all political boundaries.

C. Policy Scientists (individuals professionally concerned with knowledge of the decision processes in the public and civic orders who are committed to the appropriate use of such knowledge as a constructive influence):

(1) To foster the formulation of theories that account for patterns of governmental actions and their consequences.

(2) To develop and continuously improve the reliability and validity of a system of operational indicators of policy performance applicable on a cross-national and global basis.

(3) To enlarge the sense of professional responsibility to both the civic and public orders on a worldwide basis.

If the monitoring system is developed with some vigor and imagination, we foresee second order benefits in addition to

improvement in judgments of leaders and citizens and of the general state of social theory. Therefore, we would add to feasibility and opportunity the additional presumption of multiple payoffs. No one would expect in the near future a full-blown monitoring system covering the empirical domain implied by the goals and functions suggested thus far, but we anticipate that a concerted, sensible effort on a scale appropriate to our mobilized capabilities and talents would spread to an increasing number of political jurisdictions. We would expect the stimulation of competitive, yet complementary, appraisal activities within and between the civic and public orders. One aspect of this kind of development would be an improvement in current self-appraisals by governments and a weakening of the near monopoly of control of appraisal data and facilities now in the hands of public institutions.

We would also anticipate that organized global monitoring might tend to accelerate certain favorable tendencies already visible—for example, demands for greater participation by individuals and groups presently excluded from policy processes, and the public exposure of hitherto invisible governmental operations. An appraisal system of the sort we envisage is expected to strengthen incentives for bringing research and policy closer together and to increase the opportunities for many more colleagues to engage in activities that are at once professionally rewarding and socially valuable. The discontinuities and fragmentation that still seem to dominate certain intellectual endeavors might be reduced if we could create a collaborative system which would result over time in a spiral of simultaneous synchronic and diachronic analyses tied functionally to both theory and practice.

Although we envision multiple payoffs from the development of a capability for appraisal of governments throughout the world, let us be clear about the fundamental points we have sought to express in this preamble.

(1) There is reason for the most serious concern about the future opportunity afforded to people throughout the world to realize certain basic values that we refer to collectively as human dignity.

(2) Through the exercise of power—which itself is one of the basic values—governments affect the shaping and sharing of these values, that is, governments at all levels are a key institution in influencing the components of human dignity.

(3) Continuous appraisal of the decisions, actions, and impacts of governments as they pertain to these basic values would provide the knowledge base for judging the extent to which various values were attained and equitably distributed.

(4) The emerging capabilities of the policy sciences could make feasible a nongovernmental global monitoring system (or systems) that would make periodic appraisals publicly available on a worldwide basis.

THE IMPACT OF GMS: A SET OF SCENARIOS

We have referred to basic values and human dignity and the contribution that continuous appraisal of governments could make to their fuller achievement. To aid in the visualization of the possible impact that such a Global Monitoring System (GMS) might have on the human condition, we offer a series of selected, episodic scenarios. These imaginary scenarios are not forecasts; rather, they are designed to suggest some of the effects that an operational Global Monitoring System might have on governmental actors (the public order) and members of societies acting in their roles as citizens (the civic order). After providing a hypothetical background and context, we will offer the short scenarios as they might appear in contemporary newspaper accounts. At the end of each scenario we will note parenthetically which of the goals in the previous section are facilitated by the described events. Because at the core of the policy sciences is the commitment to improving the quality of the decision process in both the civic and public orders,[5] we also

5. Several analytic formulations of the stages or phases of decision-making have been proposed. We will use Lasswell's (1956) seven-part model of the decision process consisting of intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal. For working purposes, the *intelligence* function can be understood to include the gathering, processing, and dissemination of information to participants in the decision process; *promotion* is the mobilization of support for

note how each scenario conceivably contributes to some phase of a governmental decision process.

Let us establish the context. Assume it is January 1986. The Global Monitoring System (GMS) is beginning its fourth turbulent year of operation. Its official establishment early in 1983 followed by two years the close of the World Appraisal Year (WAY). During the 12 months of WAY, jurists, system engineers, as well as social and behavioral scientists from some 35 countries participated in the collection and evaluation of data on the political, economic, and social conditions of humankind and the governmental goals, policies, and actions bearing upon them. The appraisal had been designed for three purposes: (1) to assess the performance of various subnational political entities, national governments, geographical regions, and the entire globe in the provision and distribution of various material goods and services and the availability of certain other values expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) to provide a common base-line against which future political performances could be assessed; and (3) to construct a test of two widely discussed theories developed in the late 1970s, both of which made explicit forecasts about the expected conditions in 1980. In effect, the World Appraisal Year of 1981 had been a series of multinational pilot projects in appraisal.

The World Appraisal Year itself had been the culmination of three years of diligent work and a number of international conferences involving an expanding group of policy scientists from throughout the world. At the end of the World Appraisal Year the participants issued a declaration calling for a permanent global network for planning, forecasting, and monitoring in the areas that had been the focus of the year's effort. In 1983, two years after the declaration, the Global Monitoring

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action; *prescription* is the formulation of general goals and instrumental norms; *invocation* is the provisional characterization of concrete situations in terms of the norms; *application* is the final characterization; *termination* is the ending of prescriptions and the adjustment of claims that arose during the period in which the prescriptions were in effect; and *appraisal* is concerned with characterizing the degree to which policy objectives have been achieved, and with assigning responsibility to those who effectively conditioned the results and are formally responsible for them.

System was established. Considerable evaluation of the results of the WAY occurred during those intervening two years. The revisions in indicators, collection systems, data quality control procedures, techniques for coordination of data acquisition, and means of collaboration between scholars that had been learned as a result of the pilot projects in the World Appraisal Year had been incorporated in the Global Monitoring System.

GMS continued to evolve during its first three years of operation—not rapidly enough according to some of its critics. But as we follow developments occurring throughout the world during the 12 months of 1986, the effects of GMS are quite evident. What follows is an incomplete chronology of relevant events in 1986 pertaining to GMS.

GOVERNMENTAL APPRAISAL UNITS MEET: 14-17 January 1986

The second annual meeting of the International Association of Governmental Agencies Assessing Policy Impacts occurred in Lima, Peru. The meeting revealed that more governments were increasing their own internal appraisal capability. Official representatives from 51 countries attended and 32 other nations sent observers. The participants represented more than twice the number of nations involved in the session last year. The rapid growth in such agencies has been attributed to a response of governments to the quarterly reports of the private GMS, reports which have been widely circulated throughout the world. It was noteworthy that the governments represented at the conference are among those regularly included in the GMS reports.

Highlights of the session included the announcement that 22 additional governments had either expanded existing capabilities or established separate offices designed to collect uniform impact data on governmental programs in various areas. A number of governments are known to be highly incensed by their alleged performance as revealed by these GMS reports and have moved to demonstrate that their performance is superior to that reported by GMS. Although considerable tension

continues between many governments and the independent Global Monitoring System, there was increased recognition of its utility. In addition to the private conversations of delegates in the corridors, the influence of GMS was acknowledged in various ways, including the meeting's recommendation that governments adopt and use as standard reporting devices the GMS indicators on health care services and educational attainment. Moreover, three members of the elected board of directors of GMS addressed the delegates. Delegates of 11 of the governments revealed that their offices had sought the assistance of scientists who have been active in GMS. Several resolutions adopted by the meeting were sharply critical of certain appraisal procedures of GMS and recommended modifications. Of great interest was the claim made by most of the agencies represented that they had provided information to their governments in the past year, resulting in modifications of official policies.

(This scenario illustrates movement on political actor goal A3—innovation in appraisal routines. It also illustrates phases of the decision process. The governments that have established appraisal offices have made decisions representing the *application* phase. The resolutions passed at the conference designed to influence both governments and GMS constitute examples of *promotion*.)

USING GMS FINDING, BRITISH LABOR RETAINS MAJORITY: 15 February 1986

The Labor government in England won a majority of the seats in the House of Parliament in national elections yesterday. The party had called the elections after the widely circulated fourth quarter GMS report showed substantial improvement in income distribution and public welfare in Britain over the past three years. Labor had used the report extensively in the campaign. The significance of the election outside of England revolved around the success of an incumbent government in using GMS data to gain reelection. In the past six months, GMS

findings have figured prominently in three national elections, but in the previous instances, they had been emphasized by opponents of those in office. The British government had been an early supporter of the World Appraisal Year and GMS. The Labor government had initiated several major programs based on early GMS data.

(The election illustrates political actor goal A2–providing governments with information on the effects of their actions, and citizen goal B1–determining whether government is adequately committed to citizen values. The reference to the use of GMS findings to determine national needs shows how the monitoring system could be used to serve the *intelligence* function in the decision process. The feedback from GMS on Labor's new program represents how it can be used for the *appraisal* phase of decision making. Clearly the Labor Party used the results for *promotion* in their campaign.)

INDIA SEEKS AID TO IMPLEMENT GMS SUPPORTED THEORY: 23 February 1986

India formally applied today to the World Bank for financial assistance for a new program of urban relocation and modularization to be implemented initially in Calcutta, New Delhi, and Bombay. The proposed program follows the theoretical work on urban populations done over the last decade. The most recent version of that theoretical research has been confirmed by GMS data collected on a number of the largest cities in the world. Those cities with the characteristics specified by the theory have adapted most effectively to the large increases in urban population that continue worldwide.

(In addition to providing another example of political actor goal A3–policy innovation–this scenario illustrates the policy scientists' goal C1 that concerns the stimulation of policy-oriented theory. By providing the Indian government with a provisional means of integrating their administrative assets for dealing with the problem of a growing urban population, the monitoring system contributed to the *invocation* phase of decision making.)

POPE ESTABLISHES INCENTIVE PROGRAM TO REDUCE ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES: 30 March 1986

In his Easter message, the Pope condemned the increase in economic inequality in real income both within countries and between countries. He appealed to men and women of goodwill in all countries "to act vigorously to correct this grave injustice." As a step toward changing the direction of this trend, the Pope announced that the World-Wide Catholic Relief and Assistance Agency would make parallel grants of its own for each new commitment by an industrialized nation. The Catholic grants would involve commitments of trained professionals as well as financial support. The Pope also made general reference to the lack of any sustained advance on a worldwide basis in freedom of worship and beliefs. This reference and the one to economic inequality are known to be the result of the Pope's concern with the 1985 GMS reports. It is believed to be the first time any Pope has cited the efforts at global appraisal.

(As a nongovernmental actor, the Pope is both expressing increased sensitivity to need–goal A1–and initiating policy innovations–goal A3. The monitoring system provided *intelligence* for his decision process, which in turn led the actor to engage in *promotional* and *prescriptive* decisional activities.)

SOUTH AFRICA CHALLENGES GMS FINDINGS ON PRESS CENSORSHIP: 3 May 1986

The Republic of South Africa, claiming that the GMS data for 1985 were "grievously in error," invited a distinguished group of foreign journalists and other individuals to inspect firsthand the effects of the government's legislation on press responsibility. The Third Quarter GMS report for 1985 indicated statistically significant increases in press censorship in South Africa since the enactment of the legislation last April.

(Although the government denied that its policy has hindered a segment of its population, this scenario indicates that GMS increased its sensitivity to conditions in the society and hence

contributed to political actor goal A1. By stimulating demand for revision of the government's action and influencing its policy commitments, GMS became involved with the *promotion* phase of decision making.)

POLICY SCIENTISTS TURN JOURNALISTS IN 46 COUNTRIES FOR GMS REPORTS: 29 June 1986

A study released today by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) revealed that policy scientists in 46 countries currently have continuous assignments with newspapers, radio, or television to interpret GMS reports. The most frequent arrangement is a weekly or monthly column in a newspaper or magazine. Others have regularly scheduled radio or television programs. The study found considerable independence in the interpretation and assessment of the GMS material, but generally accurate reporting. UNITAR also found that several of GMS's most popular indexes were regularly reported in news broadcasts through the world—much like stock market indicators.

(The participation by policy scientists in the public dissemination of the GMS material indicates a professional commitment to the civic order—goal C3. Their independent analysis of GMS contributes to the *appraisal* of the global appraisal system, which is an important part of the decision making process concerned with the value of GMS.)

CITIZENS FORM MINIATURE GMS IN SWISS CANTON: 13 September 1986

A group of citizens in a Swiss canton, an administrative subunit in that country, today announced the formation of an appraisal unit for their provincial government. In so doing they became the most recent example of a growing trend in a number of countries to apply the techniques pioneered by GMS to local and other subnational units. The head of the new citizen organization told reporters that "we believed the

evaluation procedures used by GMS can be applied at the local level to improve the quality of government. We have observed the success of similar groups in Italy, Germany, Japan, and the United States."

(The creation of such citizen-operated monitoring organizations illustrates the growth in public commitment to appraisal at every level of government which is a major goal–B3–of a global monitoring system. For that group of Swiss citizens, the chartering of their new organization involves the *prescriptive* phase of decision making.)

THIRD WORLD SCHOLARS CHALLENGE GMS INDICATORS: 10 October 1986

Charging bias in several standard indicators used in the quarterly GMS reports to appraise governmental performance, scholars from five Latin American and African countries demanded prompt corrections in the statistics used by the global monitoring organization. They presented a study that alleged the GMS statistics involved indicators that favored industrialized nations with large economies and that systematically misrepresented the actions of less wealthy countries in health and educational programs. Asked to comment on these charges, a member of the GMS Board of Overseers promised a full, prompt, and careful review of the new study. He noted that GMS had an active policy of continuous evaluation of its statistical procedures and encouraged independent reviews such as the present one.

(The episode supports the goal for policy scientists to work continuously to improve the reliability and validity of indicators of policy performance–goal C2. From the perspective of the governance of GMS, it represents the *appraisal* stage of decision making.)

SOUTH AFRICA RESCINDS LEGISLATION ON PANEL'S RECOMMENDATION: 7 November 1986

In a surprise move, the government of the Republic of South Africa today reversed itself and dropped its law on press

responsibility. The action followed the unanimous report by a group of foreign journalists and other distinguished individuals who confirmed that press censorship in South Africa had increased since the legislation became law. The panel had been invited by the government to study the issue after it disputed a similar conclusion reported by GMS in late 1985. The Prime Minister announced the government's plan to award compensation to several journalists who had been penalized for violating the law while it was enforced.

(The government action illustrates the *termination* phase of decision making as well as the goal of governmental feedback–A2. The foreign journalist-scholar panel contributed to the *promotion* stage of decision making, while contributing to goal C3 which concerns professional responsibility to the civic order on a worldwide basis.)

As sketchy and imaginary as these scenarios clearly are, the foregoing "cases" do nonetheless illustrate how an operative Global Monitoring System might contribute to the proposed goals and all seven phases (power outcomes) of the decision-making process: *intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal.* It is worthy of note that often a scenario had implications for more than one decision phase. We suggest that these analytically distinguishable phases exemplify another type of convenient map and guide for those GMS activities which would focus on institutional performances and policy processes.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF A WORKING GLOBAL MONITORING SYSTEM

We turn now to a highly provisional description of some of the characteristics of a Global Monitoring System. Emphasis on the tentativeness of organizational and functional specifications seems entirely appropriate for several reasons. First, it is unlikely that anyone has yet given much thought to the design of an enterprise of this kind. Second, among the elements to be

accommodated by a design are those intellectual tools and capabilities relevant to global political appraisal that already exist. Unfortunately, as far as we can determine, no comprehensive inventory of these resources has been undertaken with our particular purpose in mind. A cursory reminder of the more visible and germane "approaches," "strategies," and "movements" conveys a sense of the magnitude and importance of this task.[6] An even more compelling reason for avoiding premature closure on details is our conviction that the evolution of the projected GMS must be very much the result of a collaborative endeavor. A full technical description should only emerge through successive conceptual refinements based on feedback and counter-proposals from the world community of policy scientists and other interested parties.

As a first approximation, we envisage a global network of trained individuals, competent in various aspects of policy analysis, who would constitute the membership of a private transnational organization. Several working assumptions about this proposed private transnational organization's relationship to governments should be made explicit. First, it is assumed that not all governments will welcome appraisal and cooperate with the global monitoring capability. Many governments—perhaps most—at some time or another may feel threatened by some appraisal activities. Second, some governments may forbid competent individuals or groups in their country from participating in the global network or will let them do so only at some considerable personal risk to their domestic well-being. Third, some governments will not only fail to supply usable data, but may seek to obstruct their independent acquisition. Finally, some governments may attempt to prohibit or rigor-

6. A partial and incomplete listing of some of the relevant sectors of activity would include: *social indicators; social accounting* (e.g., the corporate social audit); *accountability* (e.g., as in the U.S. public school sector); *forecasting* (including what are called "futuristics"); *global system modeling* (e.g., Meadows et al., 1972); *social system modeling* (e.g., computer models of development); and *evaluative research* (e.g., large-scale social programs and interventions in the United States). Of course, current appraisal efforts such as the British Quarterly Index on Censorship also should be included.

ously control the dissemination of appraisal findings within their jurisdiction.

The problems posed by these assumptions call for a number of responses and require creative design in the fuller development of any appraisal system. Several provisional observations can be offered here. Cooperation of governments is not necessary, although every opportunity should be extended to those interested in being supportive. Unnecessary advocacy relationships should be avoided. It does not seem unreasonable that many governments will have mixed motives about GMS and that they will react differently. Some divisions in the world between the conditions of countries or the types of political systems may make collaboration of individuals from different types of systems in a single GMS difficult. (For elaboration of this point, see the discussion in the last section of this article on the "projection of developments.") Although universal participation in a single organization should not be abandoned until fully explored, two or more overlapping or competing GMSs staffed by participants from different countries (e.g., socialists versus nonsocialists, industrialized versus less developed) need not be unthinkable and could provide some means of checks and balances on appraisals. Moreover, up to this point this article has promoted the idea that one GMS would engage in appraisal on the entire range of basic values associated with human dignity, but again this arrangement need not be insisted upon. It might be possible to gain nearly universal participation in one GMS that addressed values associated with, say, health or education, whereas, another separate GMS dealing with wealth might have to operate with the participation of individuals from only a fraction of the world's polities and greater limitations on access to data. In summary, we recognize that it may be necessary or desirable to think of a great many variations—including appraisal systems that address a limited range of values, that monitor only some governments, that can obtain participants from only a subset of all nations, or that actively compete with one another. For economy of presentation and advancement of the case for GMS in its most comprehensive

form, we will continue to refer in the balance of this article to a single Global Monitoring System, but the reader should recognize that many less comprehensive arrangements could still contribute to some of the basic goals outlined in the preamble. With these considerations in mind, let us briefly examine four essential aspects of any GMS. They include (a) organizational criteria, (b) financial arrangements for a monitoring capability, (c) potential data bases, and (d) methodological issues.

ORGANIZATIONAL CRITERIA

Although many designs should be explored for the organizational arrangements used in a GMS, we believe that any organizational architecture should be guided by certain fundamental criteria. Initially, we invite consideration of four such guidelines.

1. *Maximum Global Participation.* The ability of the system to provide balanced appraisals depends on the involvement of professionals with a policy-science orientation from the largest possible number of countries. Such global involvement is required (a) to insure the diversity of cultural perspectives essential for designing, collecting, and interpreting the information, (b) to prevent the domination of the organization by any one nationality or its politicalization and conversion into the agent of one national government or coalition of governments, (c) to foster the widest possible dissemination of the system's products and to maximize sensitivity to feedback from all parts of the globe, and (d) to maintain a posture of openness and accessibility in order to attract creative talent wherever it may appear in the world. Stated in a limited negative form, this criterion asserts that a GMS must not have a rule that excludes qualified policy scientists because of the country in which they have citizenship. Stated positively, a GMS should actively seek a membership involving qualified participants from every possible country.

2. *Control and Management by Policy Scientists Independent of Governments.* The system should be controlled by the

organizational membership, by individuals committed to the widespread use of political appraisal (without regard for the special interests of any political actors) and to the advancement and utilization of knowledge. It should be managed by professionals with specialized skills and expertise. These properties seem most likely to be achieved if the network is an organization of individuals who are accredited with possessing certain knowledge capabilities. Membership would become something like that in national academies of science. In brief, the monitoring capability is a nongovernmental international organization of policy scientists. The membership will be expected to assume participation in a variety of roles: (a) as citizens of both a national and a global civic order, (b) as scholars committed to the advancement of scientific knowledge, and (c) as consultants and clinicians who provide clients with the benefit of their expertise.[7]

3. *Affiliate Memberships and Observers.* In addition to the operating and governing membership of individual policy scientists, the monitoring system should include other types of affiliations. For example, there may be some individuals qualified in every respect for full membership but who, for political reasons, would find complete association with the organization impossible given their national citizenship. There may be others, deeply committed to the goals and purposes of the organization but without the expertise for credentialed membership. These individuals should be encouraged to associate with the organization and support it through efforts for which they are qualified.

Beyond these individual categories of membership, it appears desirable to allow roles to be played by various types of organizations that could be affiliate members. Candidates and possible roles for such entities include: (a) *professional organi-*

7. It is evident that these roles will not necessarily be compatible with one another. For example, an individual doing contract research for a national government may have difficulty fulfilling, in a responsible and unbiased way, certain demands of his role as someone committed to the global civic order. The important requirement is not to prohibit any of these useful roles, but rather to provide checks against assuming roles with potential conflicts of interest simultaneously.

zations—to collaborate on particular projects, assist in certification, aid in the location of specialized expertise, disseminate specialized knowledge products, and appraise the monitoring system itself; (b) *universities*—to provide training and educational programs and to operate monitoring centers as described in group a above, but reflecting the institutional practices of higher education; (c) *private research units*—to collaborate on particular projects, offer sources of innovation and specialized technologies, and communicate to and assist special client groups; (d) *public information media*—to disseminate information from the monitoring system, use journalists as trained firsthand observers, and form feedback channels from various publics; (e) *national and subnational governments*—to serve as major clients for information and to cooperate in information collection; and (f) *international governmental organizations*—to cooperate in data collection and dissemination of findings and to assist in the "promotion" decision function.

4. *Organizational Checks and Balances Against Bias.* An organization that seeks to appraise publicly all major political actors throughout the world and make forecasts pertaining to their behavior is obviously vulnerable to numerous sources of bias. Among the sources of bias that could lead to error are those resulting from individual experiences or affiliations. Care must be exercised from the beginning to build in mechanisms for reducing the opportunities for biases and, even more importantly, to identify and correct them when they occur—as they inevitably must. A number of techniques can be utilized, including publicity, competition, and rotation of positions of responsibility. It is impossible to detail the possibilities here, but thought should be given to such procedures as: using criteria for selecting individuals in key positions that demonstrate a reputation for "objectivity"; conducting research with rival hypotheses and multiple indicators; and employing independent and cross-checking teams for collection and analysis, careful reporting of disputed or uncertain findings, and so on.

We regard all four of the proposed organizational criteria as essential in their own right, but their collective significance for a larger mission must be emphasized. Some persons may see in a proposal for a Global Monitoring System the dangers of an "Orwellian Big Brother" that becomes the ultimate source of intelligence employed for the benefit of a select few. Clearly the intended purpose of this proposal is totally and diametrically opposed to any such function. The assurance that these intended goals, which concern the better realization of human dignity for all people, are pursued must be manifested in the organizational design of any GMS.

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR A MONITORING CAPABILITY

We have emphasized the importance of maintaining the independence of the organization. Moreover, the unfolding design suggests that, when fully operative, the system's budget requirements could be substantial. This makes the means of financing the organization an issue of considerable importance. Ultimately, we might hope that the system would be supported primarily as a global public utility with supplemental financing from the sale of its products and services.

In the near term, however, it would seem that the system is likely to be most effective if supported by a consortium of funding sources, many of which would be nongoverning affiliate members. The following sources might be part of the financial consortium: (1) private foundations and individual benefactors, (2) contributions by international organizations, (3) contributions by private business corporations, (4) contributions by universities and other educational units (such contributions might be in the form of sabbaticals, the contributed time of needed expertise, access to university facilities for data analysis), (5) sale of data and services to governmental and private clients (such would have to be done on a sliding scale according to ability to pay in order to promote wide access, and

the public nature of all reports provided a client would need to be insured), and (6) memberships (again, a scale based on ability to pay would be necessary).

POTENTIAL DATA BASES

As stated in the preamble, two major functions proposed for a GMS would be: first, the appraisal of governmental performance on a global scale, and second, the stimulation and testing of theories bearing on policy processes including forecasts of consequences. The appraisal mission obviously implies continuing, systematic exploration of the interrelationships among policy goals, implementive practices and programs, and their actual effects on the achievement and distribution of values. Therefore, among the primary types of data to be collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated would be three: (1) *goals* that governmental actors assert they are pursuing; (2) *actions* taken (or not taken) to attain these goals; and (3) *effects* of these actions, i.e., estimates of value outcomes as previously defined. Clearly, a global political appraisal system would not start from scratch with respect to data techniques for acquiring these three kinds of information. Content analysis, aggregate and event data, and sociopolitical indicators are several well-established procedures which could be utilized.

The professed or asserted goals of political actors could be obtained through thematic content analysis of the public statements by the leaders of governments and other major political actors. Some experience of this nature has already been acquired.[8] Of course, the latent or hidden desired end states of any actor may differ substantially from those given public expression. Yet these official statements provide the best open and accountable record of professed goals. The very act of

8. See Pirro (1975) and the efforts of the CREON Project to identify first and second order professed goals from the public events of 36 nations between 1959-1968 (Hermann et al., 1973).

taking these manifest goals seriously on a cross-national basis as part of a global appraisal effort can reasonably be expected to influence the care with which they are declared in the future.

Information on public political actions can be systematically acquired in several ways. Those routine actions that do not receive separate attention each time they occur frequently can be captured in aggregate data. More novel actions become the basis for event data. Considerable knowledge in the use of both types of data has been acquired.[9] The effects of actions can be estimated by careful research designs that monitor the amount and distribution of basic values as well as the state or condition of certain institutions. The impact analysis will search for evidence of value sharing and shaping resulting from political actions. The information for such analysis can be acquired in part through the use of indicator data.[10]

The data collected for the appraisal function also can be utilized to investigate the forecasts generated from policy science theories. Appropriate for linkage to the monitoring system are theories dealing with the conditions that increase the probability of various types of political actions and/or the first and second order effects that certain types of actions are likely to have on basic values, the nature of societal institutions, and the interaction between and among international actors. A monitoring system committed to the collection of political, economic, and social data on a continuous basis would represent a major step forward. It would expand upon the earlier data collection contributions made by national census

9. Illustrative of the research experience gained with aggregate data are Banks and Textor (1963), Russett et al. (1964), Singer and Small (1972), and Taylor and Hudson (1972). Reports on event data are illustrated by Azar and Ben-Dak (1975), Hermann et al. (1973), Kegley et al. (1975), and Rummel (1972).

10. The development of social indicator techniques has been rapid in the last decade. The early volume edited by Bauer (1966) was followed several years later by a report by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1969). Further efforts are reported in Sheldon and Moore (1968), Shonfield and Shaw (1972), and in the annotated bibliography prepared by Wilcox et al. (1972). As noted by Sheldon and Parke (1975: 693), the social indicator movement "elicited responses from economists who saw a role for their skills as theorists and measurers of welfare." Illustrative of recent contributions by economists are Moss (1968) and Sametz (1968).

and statistical offices, private survey and polling centers, and, more recently, by UN agencies. This new source of information would be combined with the positive encouragement of the monitoring organization for theory-based forecasting. This capability, together with the growing recognition among investigators of the need for forecast-oriented theory and the value of a policy science orientation, could create the context for major advances in problem-oriented theory. In short, the monitoring system should act as a major stimulus for the continuous improvement of our knowledge acquisition models.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Even the brief reference immediately above to the data collection implications of the proposed GMS suggests, of course, that the demanding operational requirements of such a system must be faced. We are under no illusions on this point. To determine with much greater precision than is possible here what kinds of data must be collected to serve the global appraisal mission and to mobilize the appropriate combination of available procedures will require a much more concerted, focused effort than that to which we have been accustomed. We believe, however, that the most critical relevant issues have been identified and are reasonably well understood. Obviously, this does not mean the issues have been resolved. To list various items is not to dismiss them. But if all the problems—e.g., data quality control, accessibility, cross-cultural comparability, different symbolic meanings attached to particular indicators, competing statistical treatments, and a host of other philospohical or methodological conflicts—must be laid to rest as a precondition for moving ahead, then the journey we propose is foolhardy.

The danger, as we see it, is in the temptation to decide these issues a priori, i.e., before the full implications of appraisal of policy processes and value impacts have been spelled out. It should be possible—indeed we believe it essential—to work

backward (so to speak) from the purposes and functions of a GMS. Having established these purposes and functions, we first need to address the conceptualization (e.g., index construction) and modeling that are thereby implied. In some cases, we need "measurement decisions," not a premature jump into numbers. In other cases, we may be over-conceptualized, and there the need is for data to fill a void. In still other cases, an overabundance of data has driven our intellectual objectives, rather than vice versa. Finally, we may need much more emphasis on a multimethod strategy which goes beyond statistical manipulation.

Beyond these problems lies still another major danger to be avoided. This is the problem of technological lock-in—the commitment to a given type of data, method of analysis, and technology for supporting interpretation. Given the need for sophisticated techniques for data collection, storage, retrieval, and analysis, there is the possibility of inflexible dependency on hardware, computer routines, and types of data.

To mention these issues and problems is to take only one step toward coping with them. It will indeed be necessary to develop a set of data and technological criteria on such matters as data quality control, procedures for obtaining or approximating accessibility, checks against abuse by data sources, methodological flexibility, and so on. Given the present state of the science of data collection and management and the impressive inventiveness that has been displayed in the rather short period of time such quantitative cross-cultural research has been seriously conducted, we are optimistic that such problems can be handled.[11] The solutions will not come all at once, and first generation procedures will give way to better ones, but our predisposition is that the challenge and needs of

11. For an overview, see Naroll and Cohen (1970). Other reminders in this connection include the work of various SSRC committees (including the pioneering efforts of the Comparative Politics Committee), the HRAF, SEDAG, COCTA, and so on. Despite numerous citations which could be listed, it would appear that a concerted research attack in these areas is rather recent.

the global monitoring system should accelerate the ability of the human sciences to treat data problems creatively.

NEXT STEPS: APPLYING FIVE INTELLECTUAL TASKS

What initial steps should be taken in considering the development of a global monitoring capability? To consider this question we will apply a generalized strategy of problem-solving designed for policy analysis by one of the authors (Lasswell, 1971: 39). The strategy involves the construction of a contextual map through the consideration of five intellectual tasks. They are:

(1) *Goal Clarification*–What future states are to be realized as far as possible in the social process?

(2) *Trend Description*–To what extent have past and recent events approximated the preferred terminal states? What discrepancies are there? How great are they?

(3) *Analysis of Conditions*–What factors have conditioned the direction and magnitude of the trends described?

(4) *Projection of Developments*–If current policies are continued, what is the probable future of goal realizations or discrepancies?

(5) *Invention, Evaluation, and Selection of Alternatives*–What intermediate objectives and strategies will optimize the realization of preferred goals?

The problem of creating a GMS will be examined with respect to each of these tasks in turn.

GOAL CLARIFICATION

As already suggested, the basic goal is the creation of a nongovernmental (i.e., private), transnational organization of policy scientists who would govern and operate a global monitoring system having the goals and functions outlined in

the preamble. In pursuit of this basic goal certain facilitating subordinate goals should be considered. Because we have emphasized that only a first approximation is intended here and that the establishment of a GMS should be a collaborative effort, it follows that refinement and extension of initial specifications should be given high priority. It seems important to stress the desirability of enlisting a wide range of professional experience, talent, and skill from a diversity of cultural settings in the process of designing the fundamental architecture of any monitoring system. Building an adequate intellectual and political support base for a GMS itself will require a high order of leadership. Thus, the mobilization of a broad-based and qualified group of policy scientists emerges as a critical subordinate goal.

As the cadre of policy scientists from diverse backgrounds with varied skills increases, they can participate in the creation of a series of design papers. The basic concept of a GMS will be revised, enlarged, and detailed through design papers. The design papers, with their specifications and alternative conceptualizations, become a second subordinate goal. In turn the design papers serve as the basis for pilot projects. These initial efforts can provide trials for testing measurement devices, data collection and analysis, collaboration strategies, and many other necessary components. Experimentation with various possible features becomes a vital third subordinate goal. Together the three subordinate goals can be envisioned as a sequence of steps—some expansion in involvement followed by new design papers that, in turn, result in new pilot projects. These steps should not be regarded as a simple linear sequence, but rather as a spiral cycle which passes through multiple iterations until the GMS can be put in place on a viable basis (see Figure 1).

TREND DESCRIPTION

We find it most appropriate here to acknowledge that the present proposal intentionally builds upon the previous work



Figure 1: The sequence of necessary steps (expanded involvement, design papers, and pilot projects) reoccur in expanding cyclical fashion until sufficient capabilities are acquired to initiate one or more global monitoring systems.

and statements of numerous colleagues, efforts which have already established and maintained certain trends we believe are ripe for orchestration, intensification, and focusing. Suggestions for international data collection and appraisal efforts are not new. Sixteen years ago Deutsch (1960) called for an inventory of basic trends and patterns of national behavior using quantitative data. In several papers Bobrow (1969, 1974) has asserted the need for "international indicators." Boulding (1966: 75) has proposed a "world network of social data stations" in order to increase our knowledge of the "socio-sphere" and to obtain indices of hostility, threat perceptions, changes in value systems, and so on.

Significant methodological trends are exemplified by Brewer and Brunner (1975), by the social indicators movement,[1 2] and by Project Link, a cross-national cooperative modeling endeavor

12. For an excellent current assessment, see Sheldon and Parke (1975).

of six years standing, which in 1974 inaugurated periodic world trade forecasts.

Closer to the kind of appraisal mission advocated in the present essay are other notable examples. Eckstein (1971) provided a provocative rationale and preliminary conceptualization targeted on four dimensions: durability, civil order, legitimacy, and decisional efficacy. More recently, the late William Haggerty drafted a proposal "to develop and carry out a plan for the annual evaluation of national governments" which was to have been implemented through his Conference on Citizen Participation in World Affairs.[13] J. David Singer recommended to one of the Pugwash Conferences an early warning system for detecting and advertising increases in international tension. The idea of detecting shifts in international levels of tension and conflict has received attention from a number of scholars, including Azar et al. (1974), Holsti (1963), Newcombe and Wert (1973), and Weil (1975).

Another important development already alluded to in the efforts to predict shifts in international tension is the increase in theories of political and social phenomena that generate testable forecasts. This literature is too substantial to review here in any detail but is a trend of significance for one of the major tasks of the global monitoring system.[14] Related to these forecasting efforts are the attempts to postulate alternative world futures and to indicate how present trends would have to be changed to increase their likelihood of occurrence.[15]

We previously referred to the emergence of three major types of data that make possible the collection of the types of information necessary for the mission of the global monitoring

13. The recent and untimely death of William J. Haggerty, former president of SUNY at New Paltz and Chairman of the Committee on the World University, is a great loss to those concerned with worldwide political appraisal.

14. Some of the most recent efforts in this area include Heiss et al. (1973), Jensen (1972), Singer (1973), and the forthcoming volume edited by Choucri and Robinson (1976).

15. One example of this work is the World Order Models Project of the Institute for World Order. An overview of the project can be obtained from Mendlovitz (1974).

system. These are content analysis (particularly of leaders' professed goal statements), aggregate and event data, and social and political indicators. Without the development of such data systems, the monitoring capability would not be feasible.

ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONS

The conditions that have contributed to the research trends reviewed above are numerous and complex. The intellectual history and sociology of science required to provide a detailed and carefully developed explanation lie beyond the scope of this essay. However, any attempt to speculate about the projection of these trends into the future requires that some of the forces at work be tentatively identified.

Based upon the research briefly sketched in the previous section, it seems appropriate to characterize the last several decades as providing substantial intellectual ferment in the areas that could now provide the basis for a global monitoring capability. The methods of science have been applied to an increasing number of areas in the social and behavioral sciences with an expanding number of investigators applying the scientific approach. We have experienced a computer revolution that has encouraged new methods of modeling social phenomena and provided means for the rapid analysis of large quantities of data. The expansion of higher education and the emergence of private contract research firms created markets that attracted substantial numbers of talented, new professionals to enter research fields pertaining to all aspects of human behavior. Private foundations, governmental agencies, and business firms offered considerable financial resources for research. Moreover, a succession of international issues served to focus extensive research energy, e.g., the Cold War, economic and political development, and international interdependence.

All these and other forces might reasonably be expected to have contributed to the pattern of research previously described. Even in this period of intellectual ferment and

expansion, a plausible case can be made that organizational and institutional invention remain quite modest. In higher education, for example, the boom of expanding enrollments, academic programs, and accessible research grants did not lead many investigators or administrators to examine the adequacy of the current institutional and professional norms for the conduct of research. Increasing research specialization and strong commitments to narrow professional specialties have combined with an emphasis on original, individual research to slow the integration of talents and insights. Furthermore, restrictive notions about the requirements of science may have served occasionally as a brake on creativity and imagination. The emergence of contextual models of society and other models incorporating a wide range of variables may have been aided by technology but slowed by institutional and professional practices.

PROJECTION OF DEVELOPMENTS

In light of relevant trends in research and methodology and of the brief identification of conditions hypothesized as influencing these trends, what future projections might significantly affect the development of a GMS? The five projections we feel worthy of discussion will also be recognized as among the conditioning factors noted in the previous section. The question of central concern is: Which of these conditions (or projections) might be conducive to the birth of a global appraisal enterprise and which might be inhibitory?

(1) Reduction in research support and in the number of positions for social and behavioral scientists in universities and private research firms.

(2) Increased supervision and control over the use of resources by governments and other sources that still continue to make some research funds available.

(3) Continuation and possible intensification of major ideological cleavages between political systems that are reflected in their research facilities and/or in constraints on their range of exploration. (These cleavages include divisions between Marxists and non-Marxists, between rich and poor nations, between nationalists and internationalists, between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian political systems, and between those holding differing views on race relations.)

(4) Continued expansion of the variety and complexity of multivariate models of societies and human behavior as well as the development and improvement of techniques for the conduct of social research.

(5) Reexamination of the institutional and professional norms governing the conduct and patterns of research.

Readers may wish to modify or extend the list of projected trends and are encouraged to do so. For the moment, however, let us consider some of the implications that would follow if no interventions are undertaken to alter the consequences implied by the enumerated projections. It should be noted that there are undoubtedly significant interactions between these projections and secondary effects from each of them. For example, the continuation and intensification of ideological cleavages may combine with reduced support and greater supervision from granting agencies to retard the interaction among policy scientists throughout the world and slow the emergence of global professionalization. Other examples might involve the expansion of multivariate models of society and the reexamination of professional and institutional norms. They both might contribute to social invention with respect to new groupings of investigators who break away from all disciplines and reassemble around some new orienting model or perspective and in some new or modified organizational setting.

Without pursuing all of these implications, we may speculate about two contradictory tendencies, with respect to the prospects for establishing a global monitoring system, if these projections unfold in the future. On the one hand, the technical

capacity for creating a global monitoring system would seem likely to increase (e.g., the expansion of social models and techniques). On the other hand, the political and financial support base for such an undertaking would appear to diminish (e.g., ideological cleavages and reduced support).

The purpose of projecting developments is to enable the decision makers—in this instance those interested in the creation of a global monitoring capability—to formulate courses of action that seek to reinforce those projected trends that seem likely to promote the stated goal. Similarly, alternatives should be implemented that attempt to suppress, avoid, or neutralize trends that would obstruct goal attainment. With that in mind, we now return to the identification of some of the next steps for creating a global monitoring system.

INVENTION, EVALUATION, AND SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVES

If the projections about the future are reasonable, one conclusion is clear. We cannot let things drift or let events take their course. Without initiatives and intervention, the unfolding trends are not likely to lead easily to the creation of a global monitoring system in the foreseeable future. Those interested in creating this instrument for the promotion of human dignity will have to work to shape the future in a manner that will produce conditions more favorable to its establishment.

Alternatives that promote several needed developments deserve careful consideration. Specifically, it would appear desirable to:

(1) Identify parties with initial interest and mobilize broad-based support.

(2) Promote multiple monitoring systems.

(3) Move promptly to work on designs that cope with major obstacles.

Let us consider each of these in more detail.

Although some reconsideration of norms and organizational arrangements for conducting research may develop, we should deal with the present conditions of high professional specialization and differentiation of skills. (Indeed, it is desirable and reasonable to expect that scientists will continue to differentiate themselves according to their special talents.) Therefore, any attempt to mobilize support for a global monitoring system should recognize the diversity of individual competences and specializations that can be of value. Moreover, the organizational designs for such a system should be prepared to attract and accommodate individuals having various but compatible motivations for participation.

Indeed, it seems important not only to establish a stable pluralism within the community of individuals working for a global monitoring capability, but also to regard as useful the creation of several different and perhaps competing appraisal structures throughout the world. Given the projected ideological cleavages and political constraints that are likely to be characteristic of the world for the foreseeable future, it would seem wise not to insist on participation in a single system if to do so essentially obstructs any effective appraisal efforts. Indeed, as was noted earlier, the basic goals of the undertaking would be better served by promoting several autonomous monitoring systems whose competition could serve as check and balance on each other's procedures and products.

There is a third requirement that should be contained in any alternative considered as a possible next step. That requirement concerns initiatives to deal with the very real difficulties that must be surmounted if a global system is to be created and serve its intended goals. Some of the problems that must be addressed emerged in the discussion of the projections as well as earlier in the paper. However, it might be instructive to offer a review of difficulties that distinguishes among problems pertaining to the feasibility of creating such a system, problems relating to the quality of its operations, and problems that result if the system serves purposes other than those originally intended.

Among the major difficulties that will have to be faced if such a system is to be feasible are: (1) the technical problems of

constructing reliable and valid indicators of the distribution and quantity of various values within political units throughout the world, (2) the treatment of missing data on certain indicators for various entities, (3) the conceptual difficulties of ascertaining what measures the same phenomena in different cultures, (4) the obstacles to cross-national communication and cooperation, and (5) the limitations on financial support for a project that may be politically sensitive.

Assuming that these obstacles can be surmounted, there is a second kind of problem involving the credibility of the activities of an operating system. These include such issues as (1) establishing acceptable standards of data quality control, (2) drawing responsible inferences from the data and guarding against distorted use of statistical analyses, (3) insuring the loyalty of the appraisees and protecting them from unwarranted charges or abuse, (4) providing the widest dissemination of findings to citizens within countries throughout the world, and (5) creating an impact on political leaders, citizens, and policy scientists.

Moving beyond this second tier of problems and assuming the system works so as to minimize difficulties concerning operational credibility, there still remains the possibility that the system could be misused to serve goals other than those that we intend. Such negative goals include: (1) utilization of knowledge by those who do not share democratic values to insure their political power, (2) destructive responses by political authorities who are threatened by the findings of the monitoring system, and (3) exaggerated popular expectations concerning the distribution of values that cannot be achieved despite determined efforts, at least, in the foreseeable future. All the difficulties need to be squarely addressed early in the development of proposals. Alternatives for early steps should include strategies for coping with them.

CONCLUSION

We seem to have ended on a negative note, namely highlighting obvious difficulties attendant upon meeting the

challenge of creating a global monitoring system—a course this article advocates. Realism calls for this kind of recognition. But realism also calls for recognizing potentially available resources on hand if the need and opportunity are present. The central question raised in this article is whether or not some form of global monitoring system for governmental appraisal is an idea whose time has come.

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