

1 A LOOK INSIDE THE 'BLACK BOX': BUILDING ON A DECADE OF RESEARCH

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During the past decade, international relations and foreign policy researchers have increasingly attempted to look inside the 'black box' - to study the people who make foreign policy decisions. Instead of focusing exclusively on the nation as the unit of analysis, they have started to study the effects of different political leaders, particular decision groups, and specific types of regimes on relations between nations. Researchers who advocate this perspective have argued that nations have more than national attributes; nations have particular kinds of leaders with preferences for specific types of decision groups and regime organizations. It is individuals who make foreign policy decisions knowing something about such individuals singly and in groups may give us a better understanding of the foreign policy behavior of nations.

At the end of this decade of research, the question is appropriately raised: Where are we now and what has been learned from our look inside the 'black box'? Have we merely opened a Pandora's box, raising more questions than we have answered, or have we discovered some variables and relationships that help to account for the behavior of governments in the international arena? This chapter will review the debate over the relevance of including individual and small group phenomena in explanations of relations among nations, suggest the types of variables and relationships inside the 'black box' that seem to enhance our understanding of foreign policy behavior, and indicate some of the challenges which we face when we open the 'black box'.

ARE INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS RELEVANT TO THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR?

Three arguments are often advanced as reasons for *not* focusing on the individual foreign policymakers. One involves the criterion of parsimony, the second ease of measurement, and the third the links between individual policymakers and government actions. The argument with regard to parsimony is as follows. If it is not necessary or helpful to scrutinize the foreign policymaking processes inside a government, we can achieve a certain economy of scale. If the international behavior of nations can be attributed primarily to their position in the international system, or to national attributes, or to other nations' behavior toward them, we have narrowed the scope of the variables which must be analyzed. Moreover, if the greater percentage of the variation in foreign policy behavior is attributable to such systemic or attribute factors, why look at the actors who actually make foreign policy?

Equal in importance to the notion of parsimony is the measurement question. How can we assess the personal characteristics of policymakers around the world, let alone gain access to what goes on in decision-making circles during the foreign policymaking process? To obtain such data must the researcher acquire expertise about a specific area? At the very least, is the researcher forced to adopt a case study approach in order to provide the detail necessary for understanding the foreign policymaking process?

Furthermore, suppose specific techniques were available for measuring the personality traits of heads of government or the conflict resolution techniques used in cabinet meetings. The application of such techniques is often time consuming. The amount of time necessary to gather the relevant data may not prove to be cost effective given our gain in understanding - a nontrivial argument in this era of scarce research resources.

The third issue that is often raised concerns the assignment of responsibility for a decision. (1) When a government acts, which individual or individuals actually shaped the decision? Which groups were involved? We may know something about the beliefs of the foreign minister, for example, but unless he (or she) was clearly and significantly involved in the decision or action, do we learn anything of value by relating this information to the nation's foreign activity? We may actually be unearthing a series of spurious correlations. We are on safer ground if we focus on the government as a whole as the actor rather than

making inaccurate assignments of responsibility.

Granting the potential relevance of these three issues, however, the fundamental question still remains. How do we deal with the fact that stimuli from the nation's external environment and from its domestic environment are channeled through the political apparatus in a government, which identifies, makes decisions about, and implements foreign policy actions? What is treated as a foreign policy problem, the alternative options considered, and whether anything is done are all concerns of the individuals and groups that constitute the political apparatus. The political process of foreign policymaking is far from neutral and has the potential to shape foreign policy behavior. Can we afford to ignore it?

In the past decade, a growing number of researchers have said 'no' to this question and have begun to examine systematically how the personal characteristics of political leaders, the decision structures of a regime, and the nature of the political regime influence foreign policy behavior (e.g. East, Salmore and Hermann, 1978; Falkowski, 1979; George, 1980). In the course of this research, we have started to discover some ways of dealing effectively with the three central issues raised here.

TOWARD RESOLVING THE ISSUES

Parsimony

Consideration of the issue of parsimony has resulted in several different types of research approaches. One strategy has been to attempt to determine the potency of the various kinds of variables which presumably influence foreign policy behavior. Researchers have explored the question of how much variation in foreign policy behavior is accounted for by systemic, national attribute, and political process variables.

An example of research on potency among different types of variables is the work of Wilkenfeld et al. (1980). In their Interstate Behavior Analysis (IBA) Project, Wilkenfeld and his associates analyzed the relative potency for explaining foreign policy behavior of a set of societal variables (e.g. societal unrest, economic performance), a set of interstate relations variables (e.g. international involvement, energy dependency), a set of global variables (e.g. border conflicts, IGO memberships), and a set of psychological variables (e.g. specific elite values).

Although all four sets of variables contributed significantly to explaining the variation in the diplomatic and conflict behaviors under analysis, the global set of indicators performed somewhat better than the other three across all nations in their sample. However, when these researchers looked at specific types of governments (nations with a Western orientation, those with a closed political system, and members of the Third World), the psychological variables increased in potency. This result was particularly applicable to explanations of the foreign policy behavior of Third World countries. (2)

Instead of testing the potency of different sets of variables, other researchers have proposed that these various influences have a greater or lesser effect on a nation's foreign policy behaviour, depending on the circumstances or context in which the government finds itself. All of the different kinds of variables are relevant and exert an impact, but under varying conditions. Researchers who adopt this position argue that, by specifying the conditions, we can more adequately illuminate the relationships between possible explanatory factors and foreign policy behavior. Thus, leaders' personal characteristics are more likely to have an influence on foreign policy decisions if the leaders are predominant in their governments (see M.G. Hermann, 1978; C.F. Hermann and M.G. Hermann, 1981).

The term predominant in this context means that the leader has such authority that his/her preferences, once expressed, determine the choice. Those with differing points of view refrain from public expressions of their alternative preferences either out of respect for the leader or because of a fear of political reprisals; alternatively, they may be allowed to continue to express deviating opinions, but their points of view no longer influence the political outcome. Predominant leaders are common in developing countries (e.g. Amin of Uganda, Qaddafi of Libya, Sadat of Egypt). Biopolitical variables are apparently more relevant to explaining foreign policy behavior during stressful situations, e.g., when the government and leadership are in a crisis situation (see Chapter 6). Small group phenomena seem to be more influential in foreign policymaking in governments with large bureaucracies. Groups are more likely to be involved in making decisions if problems must work their way through agencies and inter-agency committees (see C.F. Hermann, 1978).

Another way of dealing with the parsimony issue is to suggest how the political process may modify it - amplify or diminish - the foreign policy behavior that would be

expected on the basis of the nation's previous pattern of behavior and its national attributes. Based on a nation's general pattern of relations with another nation concerning a certain foreign policy problem (e.g. a threat, a request for aid, an increase in crude oil prices), what kind of behavior would be expected? What is the government's initial predisposition toward action if we know only, for example, its prior affective history with the other government with regard to the problem, its perceived relative capabilities vis-à-vis the other nation in the particular problem area, the salience of the other government, and the international alignment of the nations involved? By ascertaining an overall external predisposition comprised of such discrete elements, we garner information about the government's initial tendency toward action regarding a specific problem.

But, is the government capable of mobilizing the resources necessary to implement its initial predisposition? Is there sufficient demand from salient elites within the society for solving the particular problem? Knowledge about such societal factors suggests ways in which the initial predisposition may be modified. If the government cannot mobilize the necessary resources or there is little demand for solving the problem, there is little incentive to act on the initial predisposition.

Both the initial predisposition and the societal disposition may point to a certain kind of activity. However, the domestic political process may delay or prevent the action. The particular administration in office may be fragmented, in a state of perpetual disagreement about the proper foreign policy action to take; there may be a dominant leader who insists on a particular course of action; the junta in power may be in consensus that military issues take automatically precedence over other types of concerns. In each case, the political process influences the initial predisposition and the societal disposition. What seems appropriate given past history and resource availability does not necessarily affect those in power. Initial attempts at conceptually and empirically linking these sets of variables are undertaken in C. F. Hermann, M. G. Hermann and East (1980); Hudson, Singer, and Hermann (1981); and C. F. Hermann and M. G. Hermann (1981).

In each of these attempts to deal with the issue of parsimony, researchers have tried to examine just where it is that individual and small group phenomena are most useful in explaining a government's external relations. The potency research compares the possible explanatory

factors most directly. The research focusing on specifying conditions and contexts grants that individual and small group variables are not invariably influential but maintains that under certain conditions such factors can be critical. The research which integrates individual and small group phenomena with influences stemming from a government's previous patterns of behavior and its national attributes is beginning the process of analytically tracing the subtle interactive effects that the various explanatory factors can have on one another in determining foreign policy behavior. The three approaches all suggest that individual and small group phenomena have a place in theoretical explanations of governments' activities in the international area.

Measurement techniques

In the past decade, researchers have also begun to confront the problem of how to measure individual and group characteristics in the foreign policy arena. Innovative techniques have been developed that involve remote assessment or assessment at a distance, taking advantage of whatever information is readily available about foreign policymakers and the foreign policymaking process. We are not generally able to interview, survey, or closely observe foreign policy elites outside our own country; however, it is possible to gain information about such elites by indirect assessment techniques, either through analyzing traces of their behavior or by seeking informants' opinions or judgments about them.

Political leaders, particularly those at the highest levels of government, leave traces of their behavior in speeches and interviews that are often recorded by the media or by the government itself. Thus, we have access to published records of the Party Congresses of the Soviet Politburo, verbatim interviews with Begin of Israel and Sadat of Egypt, verbatim accounts of Reagan's press conferences, etc. All such traces of elite behavior can potentially tell us something about the political leader - at the very least about his or her public image. By analyzing what is said and how it is said, researchers have been able to amass data about the personal characteristics of political leaders.

Various content analysis schemes which have appeared in the past decade are designed to assess political leaders' motives: e.g. their need for power (Winter, 1973, 1980; Winter and Stewart, 1977); their beliefs (e.g. their operational codes (Holsti, 1977; Johnson, 1977; and Chapter 5

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below) and cognitive maps (Axelrod, 1976 as well as Chapter 2)); their values (see Chapter 3); and their ways of interacting with others (M. G. Hermann, 1980a, 1980b). Those who use the content analysis schemes generally determine how frequently particular themes, works, or phrases appear. Emphasis on particular themes or the frequency of usage of certain words and phrases is typically assumed to be indicative of a particular characteristic. For example, the more often a political leader refers to other governments and nations in 'they' terms and his own nation or government in 'we' terms, the more nationalistic he is perceived to be. The more uneasiness and suspiciousness a political leader expresses about the motives of other leaders, the more distrustful of others he is perceived to be.

The content analysis schemes just describes focus on *what* is being said. It is also possible to learn about a leader from *how* he/she says something. From an analysis of how the material is said, we can gain information about the leader's emotional state (in particular how stressful the situation seems to be). In another source, one of the authors (M. G. Hermann, 1979b) has reviewed the various signs which indicate stress in verbal material, including the use of 'ah' repetitions, and changes in thought in mid-sentence. Wiegele (see Chapter 6) has employed a voice analysis methodology to examine the expressions of stress of U.S. presidents during international crises, utilizing their public speeches during the crisis as the source of data. Voice analysis, which focuses on physiological voice characteristic variations, assumes that a recording of the speech or interview is available.

With access to a videotape of a political leader's behavior, we can use the vast number of nonverbal indicators which psychologists have identified to infer the emotional experience of the leader in a particular situation (see M. G. Hermann, 1979b). For example, a comparison of President Nixon's spontaneous (nonpurposive) movements and self-adaptive gestures (nose rubbing, head scratching) during his televised 1974 State of the Union address and his extemporaneous several minute discussion of Watergate following the speech showed a sevenfold increase in these nonverbal indicators of stress during the presentation of the Watergate material.

In addition to examining traces of leaders' behavior, researchers have begun to consider the use of informants and country or area experts as possible sources of data both about foreign policymakers and the foreign policymaking process (see, for example, C. F. Hermann, 1981; Kent,

Blatnikoff, and Covington, 1981; Milburn, 1977). Such researchers propose to use the expertise, observations, and analytic skills of those around leaders, those who study particular countries or areas of the world, and those who function as intelligence analysts of various countries and regions to learn about foreign policymaking. Although it is a common research tool in anthropology and psychology, the use of expert judges is relatively rare in political science and in the study of international relations (cf. Mueller, 1969, pp 250-1).

Several illustrations will show how informants and experts can be used. C. F. Hermann (1981) asked country specialists to indicate which particular groups in the governments of the countries were involved in making foreign policy during a particular time period, which problems confronted these groups, and which kinds of processes the groups used in handling information and managing conflict. Using Cuban intelligence specialists, Kent, Blatnikoff and Covington (1981, p.180) asked them to respond to a series of policy questions facing Cuba as they thought the members of the Cuban hierarchy would respond. A recent television presentation which focused on the events prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 based the descriptions of meetings of the Czech Politburo and joint meetings between Soviet and Czech leaders on informants' reports of what had happened; the informants, now in exile, were key participants in the events leading to the invasion.

In using traces of behavior and experts or informants, as we noted earlier, we are trying to obtain information about foreign policymaking that is virtually inaccessible through the more conventional techniques of the survey, interview, and inventory. Unless we can continue to develop such tools, we will have difficulty determining the contents of the 'black box' of foreign policymaking. Although there is much work yet to be done to validate these techniques and increase their methodological sophistication, they currently provide us with a first cut at information that has previously been elusive. If the results using these techniques continue to prove enlightening, researchers will want to spend part of the next decade wrestling with such methodological issues as validity, reliability, and representativeness in order to further justify the use of these techniques.

Who makes the decision? (3)

In order to link the personal characteristics of policymakers and the processes occurring in policymaking groups to foreign policy behavior, we need to know who was involved in making the decision. Who influenced the choice process? In our earlier discussion of parsimony, we noted that researchers have begun to specify the conditions under which leaders' personalities and group processes are likely to have an effect on foreign policy behavior. Such research is also applicable to the question regarding responsibility and to the issue of knowing when to expect that individual and group phenomena will probably be relevant to the foreign policymaking process.

Perhaps more helpful, however, in assigning responsibility for a policy choice is to ascertain which decision unit had the ultimate authority to authorize an action or a decision not to act with regard to a specific foreign policy problem. Who were present at that strategic point in the larger decision process when the decision was made to commit or not to commit the resources of the government and, if so, how was it to be done? Although acquiring such information might appear to be an impossible task, it is possible - at least, theoretically - to distinguish three different types of decision units that are likely to be involved in making foreign policy decisions and to ascertain when each will probably be the ultimate decision unit with regard to the problem under consideration. These three basic types of decision units are: (1) The single predominant leader (a decision unit composed of a single individual); (2) the single decision group (a decision unit composed of a collection of interacting individuals; and (3) multiple decision groups (a decision unit composed of two or more autonomous decision groups, none of which has the authority singly to commit resources or to override the decision of the other groups).

Let us examine each of these potential decision unit types more closely. Castro's Cuba exemplifies a government with a single predominant leader type of decision unit. He is a leader whose preferences, once they are known, become those of the regime inasmuch as most overt opposition tends to evaporate after Castro has articulated his position; respect for the leader or fear of reprisal (or both) lead subordinates to align their views with his. The choices of one individual can determine the government's actions; when others are involved in the policymaking process, they serve in an advisory capacity.

In this type of decision unit, the critical set of variables consists of the personal characteristics of the predominant leader. The leader's personality helps to shape his/her initial inclinations and also affects if or how the leader will regard advice from others, direct information from the external environment, and assess the political risks associated with various courses of action (see M. G. Hermann, 1977, 1980a).

When no one individual has the ability to determine routinely the regime's position on a class of foreign policy issues (or if such an individual declines to exercise such authority), then an alternative ultimate decision unit must operate. One possibility is the single group. Such a group acts as the ultimate decision unit if all individuals whose preferences are collectively essential for allocation decisions are members of the same group and that group makes decisions through an interactive process among its members.

Such decision units are common in contemporary governments. The Politburo of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Politburo in China, the National Security Council in the United States, and cabinet or subcabinet groups in various parliamentary governments are examples. To be an ultimate decision unit, a single group does not have to be established legally or formally or be granted legal authority in certain areas. Instead, it must in practice have the de facto ability to commit or withhold resources without another unit being able to reverse its decisions at will. Nor is it necessary that the group exercise such authority over all foreign policy matters; what is necessary is that there be some class or domain of foreign policy issues about which it is empowered to make authoritative choices for the regime. The concurrence of all group members may not be necessary for every decision of the unit nor must all members have equal weight in the formulation of a group decision. If, however, some formal members of the group are never essential to making a group decision, then it would be more accurate to recognize the existence of a subgroup that excluded such persons.

It may be worth noting that many governments that are organized into large bureaucratic ministries, departments, or agencies can often be interpreted as networks of groups with one high-level group as the ultimate decision unit. In many bureaucratic networks, the groups involved with a particular class of issues may be connected laterally as well as hierarchically with respect to authority levels and may include inter-organizational groups with representatives drawn from separate ministries.

With a single decision group as the decision unit, group structure and process variables become critical to explaining foreign policy behavior. How the group is structured and the resultant processes can both affect what the government does. The power distribution within the group, how conflict within the group is managed, and whether the group members are delegates from other groups or leaders in their own right, for example, become important considerations if the single decision group model applies (see George, 1980; C. F. Hermann, 1978).

It should be evident that another major alternative exists when the ultimate authority is neither a single individual nor a single group. In this case, we have multiple (two or more) separate groups, none of which can commit regime resources without the support of all or some of the others. To be one of the groups in the set classified as the ultimate decision unit, a group must be capable of giving or withholding support that, when combined with the support (or lack thereof) of other groups, is sufficient to determine whether regime resources will be allocated. For a set of multiple autonomous decision groups to constitute the ultimate decision unit, no superior group or individual can resolve differences among the groups or reverse any decision the groups reach collectively.

Classic examples of multiple autonomous groups as the ultimate decision unit are coalition governments in parliamentary systems. On those occasions where no one political party has enough parliamentary votes to elect a cabinet itself and several parties form a government, the multiple autonomous group configuration can be assumed to hold if each party retains direct oversight of its cabinet members and instructs these cabinet members on important issues. Lebanon shortly before its civil war may offer a specific illustration of such a pattern.

Clearly, foreign policy behavior under the multiple groups decision unit pattern requires the forging of agreement among the separate groups. Most important in determining whether a working coalition emerges is the cluster of variables dealing with the nature of the political regime (see Salmore and Salmore, 1978; Hagan, 1980). For example, the existence of some representative body with accepted rules of procedure for coordinating the positions of the separate groups constitutes an important facilitating mechanism. Groups that have such a coordinating mechanism, accepted 'rules of the game' for reaching agreement, and an underlying acceptance of the right of other groups to exist have a better chance of reaching

agreement than those that must attempt to build coalitions without such mechanisms.




FIGURE 1.1 Determining the ultimate decision unit in the CREON model.

How do we determine which of these decision unit models holds for a particular government? Figure 1.1 suggests one way of assigning responsibility. Data have been

collected within the Comparative Research on the Foreign Events of Nations (CREON) Project to determine answers to each of these branch points for a sample of twenty nations (see Hagan, 1980; C. F. Hermann, 1978; C. F. Hermann et al., 1973; M. G. Hermann, 1978, 1980b; Hudson et al., 1981).

No attempt will be made here to review each step in the diagram, but we can offer a general characterization of the modes of dealing with the basic branches. The diagram begins with the question of whether or not a given political regime has a predominant leader. As noted earlier, if a predominant leader is present, the choices of a single individual can determine the government's action. A predominant leader, however, may allow the ultimate decision unit to be another entity, if the problem is not critical or protocol does not require the leader's involvement or if the leader is relatively uninterested in foreign policy matters.

Assuming that a single individual is not the ultimate decision unit, then the task is to establish whether a single collective body has that authority. The questions on the right side of Figure 1.1 are designed to ascertain whether or not such a single unit exists for the given issue area(s) involved in the problem. As we noted earlier, it is possible that a single ultimate decision group may exist for one area of foreign policy (e.g. military affairs) and not be applicable to other areas (e.g. trade and emigration). Of relevance in determining if a single decision group is the ultimate decision unit are the group's degree of involvement with a substantive issue, its involvement with critical problems, and its place in the organizational or bureaucratic hierarchy. The last two branching points on the right side of Figure 1.1 suggest when multiple autonomous groups form the ultimate decision unit. If the regime is fragmented and if two or more policy groups have more than limited involvement with the substantive issue, we have multiple autonomous groups; this type of decision unit is also more likely if the problem is routine.

This discussion suggests that by ascertaining the probable location of the decision we have a better idea of the types of variables that can influence foreign policy-making. Thus, if the ultimate decision unit is the single predominant leader, his/her personal characteristics become important; if the ultimate decision unit is a single decision group, small group phenomena are critical; and, if the ultimate decision group is, in fact, multiple

autonomous groups, then regime factors come into play. The type of decision unit provides cues as to which variables researchers should examine.

WHICH TYPES OF VARIABLES SHOULD WE STUDY?

In the previous section of the chapter, we argued for the relevance of looking inside the 'black box' examining the people involved in the foreign policy process. Moreover, we have suggested three types of decision units that are generally responsible for making foreign policy decisions and the types of variables (whether individual or group) that seem to be critical to the decisionmaking process for each of these decision units. Let us now consider in more detail the particular individual and group phenomena that apparently influence foreign policy behavior.

Leaders' characteristics

As the chapters in this book attest, research on characteristics of foreign policymakers is on the increase. The reader is offered discussions of cognitive processes, memory-related factors, values, beliefs, and biological processes in the course of going through the chapters. What is particularly important about the chapters in this volume is less the characteristics which they explore than the fact that most look at the relationship between the characteristics and foreign policy behavior. They begin to answer the question why is it important for us to know what a leader is like? What are the implications of such knowledge for understanding a government's foreign policy behavior?

We noted earlier that the personal characteristics of a political leader become especially relevant to the study of foreign policy when the case being examined is a government with a predominant leader who is generally responsible for foreign policy decisions. What are our hunches and what does the research literature suggest are the important features which we should learn about the leader in order to project what he/she will probably advocate with regard to foreign policy?

The two pieces of information which we should probably gather at the outset center around the predominant leader's level of interest in foreign affairs and the amount of his or her foreign affairs training (cf. M. G. Hermann, 1978,

1980b). If a predominant leader is not interested in foreign policy issues, there is little likelihood that other than critical problems will be brought to his/her attention, thus lessening the general impact of the leader's personal characteristics on the government's foreign policy behavior. Moreover, with a low level of interest in foreign affairs, the leader is likely to delegate authority to others, negating the effect of his/her own personality on the resultant policy except to the extent that the spokesman's personality resembles the leader's.

Training in foreign affairs similarly modifies the relationship between a predominant leader's personal characteristics and the government's foreign policy behavior. If the predominant leader has had such training, there is less need to rely on one's own predispositions, prior experience and a repertoire of behaviors that have succeeded or failed can be consulted. With little training, what one is like becomes more of an influence on behavior; such a leader has little expertise on which to draw and, as a result, natural predispositions come into play.

Now, suppose that as a result of having examined a particular leader's levels of interest and training, we have a case of a predominant leader who is interested in foreign affairs but has had relatively little training. Personal characteristics are the key to knowing which foreign policy behaviors the leader will advocate. With such predominant leaders, it becomes important to discover their views of the world, their needs and desires, the ways in which they interact with others and how they perceive that such interactions should be carried out, and how they make decisions.

Views of the world reflect leaders' beliefs or fundamental assumptions about the world; they are leaders' images about how things function in the international arena and about their country's position in that arena. Two different sets of researchers have been quite active in the past decade in trying to portray leaders' views of the world and in relating the latter to foreign policy behavior. One group has focused on profiling the operational codes of leaders (e.g. George, 1969, 1979; Hoagland and Walker, 1979; Holsti, 1977; Johnson, 1977; see also Chapter 5). The other group has been constructing cognitive maps of individuals who are involved in the foreign policymaking process (e.g. Axelrod, 1976; Bonham and Shapiro, 1976, 1977; Bonham, Shapiro, and Nozicka, 1976; see also Chapter 2).

The operational code, which concerns the way in which a political figure defines the basic rules that govern behavior, appears to set the boundaries within which the leader will act (see Heradstveit, 1979; Hoagland and Walker, 1979; Walker, 1977). It does so by influencing the information to which a leader pays attention, by affecting the way in which this information is interpreted, and by influencing the alternative actions seen as most feasible or preferable (George, 1979). Like the operational code, the cognitive map also suggests how various objects and concepts are linked in a policymaker's mind. To date, cognitive maps have generally been developed for policymakers in specific situations or with regard to particular issues (e.g. the MBFR negotiations, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Norwegian North Sea oil policy). The cognitive map is important to understanding how foreign policymakers process and interpret information in making particular decisions and to illuminating the nature of the choice among competing alternatives.

The needs and desires of the predominant leader about which we should be particularly interested center around their reasons for entering the political arena. Are they primarily concerned with maintaining (or advancing) themselves in their office or position of power and influence (i.e. does the need for power dominate)? Is there a specific problem or area of concern with regard to their country which they are committed to solving (e.g. lack of development, social inequality, widespread corruption)? Are they interested in furthering a certain ideology or set of beliefs about how things should be done? Or are they concerned with the public support and adulation that their position brings them.

The literature on who becomes a political leader (e.g. Barber, 1965; Burns, 1978; M. G. Hermann, 1977; Paige, 1977) indicates that these are basic motivating factors which explain why persons seek political positions. These goals can have far-reaching consequences for predominant leaders' methods of handling foreign policy problems. Which situations are perceived as problems, how problems are defined, how active the leaders want their government to be in the international arena, and who is perceived as the enemy are among the issues that will be affected by these motives (see M. G. Hermann, 1980a).

The following typical ways in which the predominant leader deals with other policymakers have been found to relate to foreign policy behavior. The first concerns the degree of interpersonal conflict which the leader can

tolerate in the policymaking process. George (1980) has observed that degree of tolerance for interpersonal conflict can be a contributing factor to the specific management styles that heads of government will choose in developing their foreign policy organizations - whether formalistic, collegial, or competitive. Leaders are likely to choose similar management styles for dealing with foreign leaders.

Two other interpersonal style variables are relevant to this discussion. One is distrust of others; how suspicious is the leader of others' motives and actions? One of the authors (M. G. Hermann, 1980b) has found that this characteristic relates to how willing leaders are to commit their resources in the international environment and how friendly they are in their external relations. The other variable involves whether the leader focuses primarily on accomplishing the task or on maintaining group cohesiveness; this variable is quite prominent in the leadership research literature (see Stogdill, 1974). Both situations have important implications for the issue of how the leader will proceed to act in the international arena: whether he/she will be concerned about others and willing to work interdependently with others or whether he/she will be concerned only about achieving a certain goal regardless of the costs.

In addition to a predominant leader's style of interacting with other policymakers, we also need to learn about his or her characteristic decision styles. What are the leaders' preferred ways of making decisions? Are they interested in eliciting a variety of opinions and promoting open discussions before a decision is made or do they solicit only recommendations from which to choose? Do they control their own information network or do they allow others to structure the flow of information? How decisive are they? Do they insist on consensus among advisers or in other parts of the government before a decision is made? How confident are they about their decisions?

The answers to such questions can help to determine how the predominant leader will approach the foreign policymaking task (cf. George, 1980; M. G. Hermann, 1980a). This information is also suggestive of the style of behavior which such leaders will use when dealing with other governments. As an illustration, leaders who are relatively closed to new information and resist varying options - but are simultaneously decisive and confident - tend to engage in higher levels of aggressive behavior in their encounters with other nations than leaders with the

opposite set of characteristics (see, for example, Driver, 1977; M. G. Hermann, 1980b). Being open to information and alternatives leads to less aggressive behavior, while indecisiveness and lack of confidence often promote seeking support from other governments.

Elsewhere, M. G. Hermann (1980b) has proposed that the characteristics which we have been discussing - views of the world, needs and desires, ways of interacting with others, ways of making decisions - interrelate to help determine political leaders' general orientations to foreign affairs, i.e. their predispositions when faced with a foreign policymaking task. Views of the world and needs/desires affect the content of the foreign policy orientation; these characteristics help political leaders to interpret their environment, providing them with maps for charting their course. Moreover, such factors imply that certain strategies are preferable for achieving one's goals and, at times, shape the nature of the goals. Ways of interacting with others and making decisions influence the style of the foreign policy orientation. The extent to which political leaders generally feel comfortable in working with problems and persons in the environment generally carries over into the foreign policy arena.

For illustrative purposes, let us describe two of the orientations, both of which often characterize predominant leaders: the expansionist and the influential orientations. These two orientations, along with four others (see M. G. Hermann, 1979a, 1980a, 1980b) are determined by interrelating six personal characteristics: nationalism; belief in one's own ability to control events; need for power; need for affiliation; conceptual complexity; and distrust of others. These orientations have been studied empirically for a sample of 45 heads of government who were in office during the decade 1959-68 (see M. G. Hermann, 1979a, 1980b; M. G. Hermann et al., 1979). In addition to ascertaining which leaders had which orientations, this research measured the relationships between the orientations and foreign policy behavior and between the orientations and decision structures and processes.

Having an expansionist orientation implies a willingness to urge one's own government or like-minded parties to consider enlarging their territorial or resource claims. For the expansionist, the world is divided into 'we' and 'them', with conflict the name of the game as the moves of others are judged to be inimical to 'our' goals and desires. Such a leader has little need to search for information or

alternatives in making foreign policy decisions, generally assuming that 'we' know why 'they' acted. The expansionist orientation is characteristic of leaders who are highly nationalistic, distrustful of others, and have a high need for power but little need to relate to others. Such leaders have a tendency to stereotype objects and persons in their environment and usually believe that they can control events in their environment.

Castro of Cuba is a current predominant leader with such an expansionist orientation. Such leaders want persons around them who are loyal and will do whatever they are told; they tend to have little tolerance for deviant points of view, perceiving power plays in such behavior. Expansionists usually focus on issues of power and status in the international arena as well as in their domestic environment. As a result, they often engage in hostile actions, committing only those resources necessary to achieve their goals. Their behavior is usually directed toward the 'enemy', who is viewed as being always out to limit their gains.

Leaders with an influential orientation seek to have an impact on other nations' foreign policy behavior. They want to play a leadership role in the international arena, shaping the nature of events and the goals of a set of nations. Leaders with this orientation have an uncanny ability to be responsive to the desires of those governments which they are trying to influence. These leaders seek out problems in the foreign policy area over which they can exercise some influence, thus gaining prestige abroad as well as at home. An influential orientation characterizes leaders who have a strong need to control others, believe that they can control events, have a need to establish and maintain friendly relations with others, are able to differentiate objects and persons in their environment, have little distrust of others, and are not overly concerned with nationalistic goals or dreams.

Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast typifies the predominant leader with an influential orientation. Such leaders are highly manipulative but subtle in their actual use of manipulative techniques. They engage in a lot of 'behind the scenes' power activity and are not above pitting factions against one another so that they can appear to be mediators or 'the great compromiser' who settles the problem. These leaders are often perceived to be charismatic because they are sensitive to what will 'sell' with the particular constituency which they are courting at any given time. The influential orientation leads to a

cooperative demeanor in relations with others and certainly toward those governments which such a leader desires to influence. Leaders interested in being influential engage in a mixture of independent and interdependent activities, depending on the situation and the target country. In order to keep their options open, however, such leaders are unlikely to want their governments to make extensive commitments to other nations; they do not want to lose control over the situation. Much of the activity which leaders with this orientation urge on the government is diplomatic in nature.

These two orientations were used for illustrative purposes to highlight a fundamental difference that has implications for our ability to explain the foreign policy predispositions of a predominant leader. Leaders with an expansionist orientation are relatively insensitive to the situation in which they find themselves; their traits act as a lens, translating incoming stimuli to fit a certain image. Thus, by knowing that a predominant leader has an expansionist orientation, we can begin to make probabilistic forecasts about what the leader's government will do in the foreign policy area.

Leaders with an influential orientation, on the other hand, are sensitive to the situation in which they find themselves; they closely monitor what is happening to obtain cues as to how they should act to achieve their ends. These leaders use information from the environment to improve the effectiveness of their influence attempts. As a result, we can be less sure of what will happen if we are looking at a government with a predominant leader who has influential orientation. Other pieces of information - other types of variables - come into play (for example, variables that characterize the nature of the regime). Do the elites in the government have a shared belief about the particular problem at hand to which the leader must be responsive to maintain his/her position? Is there some division within the government just below the surface to which the leader must be attentive in order to keep it from spreading? Is there opposition within the society that is becoming organized and more vocal? In effect, if we are concerned with explaining the foreign policy behavior of predominant leaders who have influential orientations, factors in addition to personal characteristics become relevant for determining what they will urge their governments to do. Some exploratory attempts to specify the nature of these other factors are undertaken in C. F. Hermann and M. G. Hermann (1981).

Group structures and processes (5)

When the decision unit is a single group, we become interested in that group's characteristics, its structure and the processes by which the group maintains itself and goes about its business. There is a large bureaucratic politics literature as well as an extensive body of work on small groups; both suggest how a decision group is constituted and trace how the norms, rules, and techniques which are used to reach a decision affect the resulting behavior. To illustrate, bureaucratic politics researchers (e.g. Allison, 1971; Halperin, 1974; Halperin and Kanter, 1973) have proposed that 'pulling and hauling' between representatives from conflicting organizations often results in policy that does not reflect the position of any of the involved parties. Janis (1972), in contrast, has suggested that policymakers are motivated to maintain the well-being of their groups and thus do not consider conflicting information or challenge prevailing ideas as carefully as they probably should - often satisficing and selecting the single option that the group considers, he refers to this phenomenon as 'groupthink'. A careful examination of these two cases, however, reveals that the nature of the groups differs, the processes differ, and the resulting behavior is different. The consideration of these differences in structure and process has implications for understanding the foreign policy decisions that will result when a single group is the decision unit.

C. F. Hermann (1978, 1979, 1981) has proposed two structural and two process variables that are particularly relevant to analyzing the foreign policymaking process when we are dealing with a single decision group. The structural variables are membership identity or loyalty and power distribution; the process variables center on the flow of information in the group and the group's manner of managing disagreement or conflict. (6) Table 1.1 illustrates the types of groups that result from combining the two decision structure dimensions. An example of each type of group is also given. Moreover, Table 1.1 suggests how information is processed and conflict managed in each type of group.

Table 1.1 suggests that group structure affects the ease with which a group can reach a decision, that is, the ease with which the group can reach consensus or agreement on what to do about a particular foreign policy problem. Where there are no outside loyalties and a dominant leader exists, the atmosphere is more conducive to consensus than where there are outside loyalties and an

TABLE 1.1 Processes and behaviors that occur in decision units where power distribution and role of members differ^a

	Memberships identity/loyalty	
Power distribution	Delegates from autonomous organizations (Positions depend on those of external organization; little latitude to change position)	No external autonomous unit Membership (Positions shared by group members, can change if all are so predisposed)
Dominant leader (Power lodged in one person)	(Inter-agency bureaucratic task force with head of government) Delegates feel pressure not to lose too much; often engage in pre-meeting coalition building; if cannot build coalition will exaggerate differences in positions; often accept status quo, stating any decisions in broad, vague terms	(Head of government with staff of advisors) Members of group seen as advisory to leader; little disagreement generally tolerated with members reinforcing leader's views; minimal information gathering done; if disagree with leader's position members use informal persuasion to gain some change; can make quick decisions but are often of a less cautious, less conservative nature than if consultation was more widely undertaken.
Subset of dominant leaders (Power held by minority subset of group)	(Inter-agency coordinating committee with powerful co-chairpersons) Delegates are likely to ally with leader having position closest to that of their organization; leaders will seek coalitions with delegates to increase their influence, probably through side payments;	(Legislative committee with seniority system) Leaders establish coalition framework through log rolling, trade-offs, and side payments, and compromise to insure a working majority; rules as to how decisions are made are set in place with rewards for seeing they are
	(Cabinet in parliamentary system) Coalition building is a predominant activity of this group, the less powerful members of the group playing broker or mediator roles among the more powerful; if leaders can agree on decision they will push for	

conflict may arise over how decisions are made with leaders' preferences prevailing if leaders form coalition; if leaders differ, may be push to refer problem to another group; decisions may be slow and change in nature depending on winning coalitions which allow delegates to claim some victories with some losses.

a working majority as the means for resolving conflict; time will be spent in 'behind the scenes' power plays as leaders may threaten to reconstitute group toward their own ends; can take fairly bold actions if working majority in place.

implemented; advocacy of differing alternatives is sanctioned if not too deviant from position of working majority.

Approximate power parity (Power dispersed across members of group)

(Inter-agency work group)

Members experience cross pressures of loyalty to external organization and group; engage in slow, incremental bargaining with trade-offs, log rolling, and compromise; may seek outside information to aid in deliberations; extreme behavior highly unlikely, as response often is qualified or limited to take in the varying positions; decisions are often postponed or referred to other groups; deadlock is a definite possibility.

(Military junta)

Although have initial loyalty to external organization, soon learn that only way can make decisions is if become a cohesive unit; time is spent in designing decision rules to maintain cohesiveness; information is often distorted to enable consensus to be achieved; problems that have the possibility of leading to disagreement are avoided; tendency to accept options on which can build consensus regardless of consequences.

(Autonomous board, commission or court)

Because support and respect from other members is important to being able to make decisions, have high concern for group welfare and cohesiveness; attempt not to put person in position of 'loser' but if take deviant position too often will be isolated; develop impersonal decision rules as 'split the difference' and 'let external developments dictate our choice'; can lead to highly assertive, high commitment behaviors.

^aThis table builds on material from C. F. Hermann(1978, 1979) and C. F. Hermann et al. (1979)

^bExamples of each type of decision unit are listed in parentheses before the description of processes and behaviors.

equal distribution of power in the group. Moreover, the group members are motivated to promote consensus in an effort to build or maintain a cohesive working unit. With outside loyalties and identities as well as an unequal distribution of power, consensus and agreement become more problematic. Time must be spent jockeying for position and checking signals with the organizations that are represented. In these groups, how the issue of disagreement is handled becomes important to what will happen (as Table 1.1 indicates).

It has been observed that being able to reach consensus easily serves to reinforce the inclinations of group members (see George, 1980; Janis 1972; C. F. Hermann and M. G. Hermann, 1981). With shared interpretations and recommendations, the members tend to confirm one another's conclusions. Members become more sure of themselves as well as more confident about the course of action (or inaction) being advocated. There is less qualification and more unequivocal declaration of the recommended means of treating the foreign policy problem at issue. The group deliberations amplify the prior inclinations of the members and appear to make the results more extreme (less moderate) and more certain (less qualified) than individual members were before the policymaking session(s).

To know that a group can reach consensus easily and that consensus amplifies prior inclinations does not say anything, however, about the direction or content of the decision. The group may be adamant about doing nothing with regard to a problem or may want to take decisive action. Without some knowledge about the preferences of individual group members, decision structure and process data do not provide us with meaningful information about the decision's content. But, we can make some guesses about the direction of group consensus on the basis of several other variables.

If the foreign policy problem facing the group refers to a matter about which there is a shared regime orientation, this orientation suggests the content of the decision and affects the way in which the group consensus will amplify the decision. A regime orientation consists of a set of shared beliefs that members of the government hold about ways of dealing with other countries. Thus, there may be a shared belief that another government is an adversary or enemy and not to be trusted (e.g. Israel for Syria, the Soviet Union for China). If the problem concerns this traditional enemy, the action is likely to be assertive toward that enemy, particularly if a dominant

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consensus exists within the decision group. Another shared belief may be that the government is and must remain economically dependent on another country. The assumption is that development is possible only through such a relationship (e.g., the Soviet Union for East Germany, France for the Francophone African countries). With such a regime orientation, the decision group will be cautious in its foreign policy activity if the problem involves these countries.

If the decision group has a dominant leader (or leaders), that individual's orientation toward foreign affairs may also shape the nature of the decision. When the group with such a dominant leader achieves prompt consensus, it will often be built around the leader's orientation.

But, what about the groups in Table 1.1 where disagreement and conflict must be managed before consensus is possible? Much of the group process focuses on trying to bring the various factions with their differing interpretations and proposed alternatives together in order to reach agreement about how to deal with the foreign policy problem at hand. A definite possibility exists that such groups may end up in a deadlock or decide to refer the problem to another group, thus avoiding the need to make a decision. If a decision is made, it is often minimal in nature (e.g. a diplomatic gesture stated in broad, vague terms).

Whether or not a consensus is ever reached can depend on several outside factors: whether or not the regime itself is highly fragmented and the strength of opposition to the regime among other elites and in the general public. If the regime itself is highly fragmented, the decision group may find itself cross-pressured by the various factions and probably will contain representatives of these factions within it. It will become even more difficult to reach a decision because status in the regime may rest on whose decision prevails. There will be a tendency for the group to postpone dealing with the problem if it can do so. If there is strong opposition outside the government with regard to a particular foreign policy problem, the decision group may be forced to deal with this opposition. The group can cope by pacifying the opposition (coopting their position and proposed action) or by minimizing the opposition by directing behavior toward management of the opposition rather than the problem.

An illustration of the effect of opposition on a deadlocked single decision group can be derived from the Soviet Politburo's long debate about how to react to the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968.

There is some evidence that the Politburo was deadlocked in the early summer of 1968 (Valenta, 1979). Politburo members were divided. According to Valenta (pp. 20-1) their varying perceptions on this issue led them to take different stands, and consequently to build or join two opposing coalitions: those in favor of and those against military intervention.

The upshot of the deadlock was a 'decision' to postpone dealing with the issue by entering into the fact-finding negotiations at Cierna and Bratislava at the end of July. The rather bland communique issued at the end of these negotiations, however, rallied domestic political opposition within the Soviet Union to the Czech reforms. Those favoring military intervention (bureaucrats responsible for ideological affairs, the Ukrainian Party bureaucracy that feared the spread of Czech reforms into their territory, sections of the KGB responsible for intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, and some segments of the Soviet armed forces) pressured the Politburo and the coalitions under- went a change. On August 20-1 troops from the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. As Valenta (1979, p.145) notes:

The advocates of military intervention in Moscow won the debate only during the last round of their offensive, which began around August 10.....Skeptics of military intervention were, for the first time during the long crisis, unable to resist the pressure, because, as one of them put it, they 'were unluckily in the minority'.

In summary, group structure variables play a part in determining how single decision groups will process information and resolve disagreements in making foreign policy decisions. Moreover, these variables suggest which groups are likely to reach a consensus quickly and which groups will experience potentially immobilizing conflict. Rapidly achieved consensus can affect the nature of the group's decision by making it both more certain and more extreme. What the particular decision will be in such groups results from shared beliefs within a regime or from a leader's orientations. Where a group finds itself in disagreement and conflict, the strength of political opposition in the society and the degree of fragmentation within the government can exacerbate matters, leading to deadlock and delay forcing policymakers to resolve these more widespread disagreements before confronting the foreign policy problem. Response to the foreign policy problem is generally minimal unless the opposition compels the decision

group to take a strong stand. The ideas outlined here are developed in more detail in C. A. Hermann and M. G. Hermann (1981).

Regime variables

The nature of the political regime becomes important when the decision unit involves multiple groups. By political regime, we mean the set of individuals who hold power in a government at a particular point in time. Or, more precisely, the set of roles in which inheres the power to make authoritative policy decision (Salmore and Salmore, 1978, p. 110). The particular regime variables which apparently influence the likelihood of agreement among multiple groups and the nature of that agreement include regime fragmentation/cohesion, regime orientation, and opposition to the regime (see Hagan, 1980; Salmore and Salmore, 1978).

The more fragmented the regime, the more likely it is that foreign policymaking power will be vested in the hands of multiple groups. Fragmented regimes are composed of factions vying for power, with each one interested in having an input into decisions. The greater the differences among the various factions, the harder it will be to develop a working coalition and produce some agreement among the groups on the nature of any policy.

One factor which can facilitate the achievement of an agreement is the presence of a regime orientation. Even members of a fragmented regime may share certain common political beliefs about external relations or specific situations. Thus, a strong threat from a traditional adversary may unite groups in situations where disagreement had previously been prevalent. Moreover, a leader of one of the groups may attempt to use such an orientation as a rallying point and the source of a precedent for action.

Societal opposition outside the political system can also lead to some agreement and action among multiple groups; but often, however, such action is directed toward coping with the opposition rather than dealing with the foreign policy problem. This seems to be particularly the case if the opposition is using illegal means against the government.

In spite of regime orientation and opposition, however, in most cases deadlock is the result when multiple groups are the ultimate decision unit; no winning coalition of groups can be assembled to permit decisions on resource allocation. Moreover, there is no organized political authority to which

the problem can be passed for resolution. By definition, no group is capable of acting alone on behalf of the regime or, if it can do so and does, the political system will be transformed. As an example of a nation with a multiple groups decision unit that repeatedly faced this deadlock problem, we note the coalition governments in the French Fourth Republic.

Persuasion, tradeoffs linking various issues and personalities, appeals to third parties or the public to apply pressure on opposing groups, dissolution and reconstitution of the regime, and extralegal means of coercion or group transformation are among the tactics available to multiple autonomous groups that can be employed to attempt to resolve the disagreement. What if these efforts fail or do not occur in a sufficiently timely fashion to permit a foreign policy response before the international situation is transformed? The answer seems clear. A political regime with deadlocked multiple groups as the ultimate decision unit can undertake little or no action. At the most, there may be basic caretaking operations, activity that a head of state, foreign minister, or senior civil servant may feel qualified to initiate without successfully resolving the basic political issue. Such an action might include continuation of the status quo, appeals for more time, requests to others to handle the problem temporarily, or extremely broad and vague policy declarations which in no way resolve the issues in conflict.

CONCLUSIONS: SOME CHALLENGES

That foreign policy behavior is complex is undeniable; there are no simple ways of explaining government actions in the international arena. We are beginning, however, to develop better ideas about which factors are important to explanations of foreign policy behavior and which aspects of the domestic political process should be included among such variables. Certain individual and small group phenomena are relevant to explaining foreign policy activity. After a decade of research, we can identify, as we did earlier in this chapter, some of these individual and small group variables. If we hope to progress beyond where we are now in our explorations inside the 'black box', though, we face certain challenges. In closing, let us examine several of the more important of these challenges.

One of our tasks is to flesh out the explanatory logic linking the relevant individual and small group phenomena

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directly and indirectly to governments' foreign policy behavior. Why do we expect individual and small group phenomena to influence a government's actions? In much of the research on the potency of different sets of determinants summarized earlier, researchers tended to correlate variables with foreign policy behavior on the basis of hunches about which variables might have an influence - but with little concern for *why* the factors might have effects. In beginning the process of specifying the conditions under which we should examine individual and small group phenomena - i.e. identifying situations, personalities of leaders or decision structures can be expected to exert influence on decision making - we are starting to delimit the necessary explanatory logic. Moreover, by offering propositions about how individual and small group factors can modify what could be expected on the basis of a government's relations with other nations and its capabilities, we are moving toward the models of foreign policy behavior that have so long eluded us. In the next decade, we need to accelerate our efforts in this theory-building direction.

It is not enough, however, to determine which variables influence governments' foreign policy actions and why; we must also indicate what kind of foreign policy behavior will result. How will the government act under these conditions with this leader or group making foreign policy decisions? What is the behavior which we are seeking to explain? Much of the foreign policy literature has focused on explaining conflict behavior (e.g. Azar, 1973; Rummel, 1977; Wilkenfeld et al., 1980); although it is important, conflict behavior is but one type of foreign policy behavior. Callahan et al. (1981) have proposed nine different properties that characterize foreign policy activity. Hudson et al. (1981) have shown how these properties can be linked to form a variety of substantive foreign policy actions, which provides a foundation for inferring how a nation is reacting in a confrontation, how it is collaborating with other parties, and the nature of its assistance giving and requesting behavior. When leaders and groups affect foreign policy decisions, which of these many kinds of behavior will be expected to result? Why? Here is another challenge for the next decade of research.

We have described several techniques that are enabling researchers to gather information about the personalities of leaders and the nature of the groups involved in foreign policymaking. Although we noted that these techniques are potentially useful for conducting research in an area where there are many obstacles to data collection, critics

of the techniques have identified important methodological problems. For example, does content analysis of interviews with heads of government reveal personality data or only a preferred public image? Which biases and distortions surface in area or country experts' judgments about the nature of a nation's foreign policymaking questions? Further research is needed to address these questions. It would be unfortunate, however, if all of our attention were devoted to these methodological issues. As a result of the availability of techniques such as these, we are almost at the threshold of achieving a better understanding of the effects that the 'black box' can have on foreign policy. We need to continue using these techniques and to experiment with other approaches to generating data as well as to focus directly on the methodological issues. We need to be creative in discovering other sources of data on leaders' personalities and group structures and processes.

In discussing who makes foreign policy, we noted some conditions where the knowledge of who is involved indicates which variables can be expected to influence a government's foreign policy behavior. Thus, if the head of government is predominant, interested in foreign policy issues, and has a foreign policy orientation that makes him/her relatively insensitive to the immediate political context, the leader's personality will probably be reflected in national foreign policy decisions. If the decision unit is a single group that is structured so that it can reach consensus promptly, then group variables come into play. When foreign policy decisions result primarily from interaction among multiple groups, we can predict with a high degree of probability that there will be a deadlock.

Foreign policymaking becomes significantly more complex inside the 'black box' when we have a predominant leader who is sensitive to the political environment, a single group that is in disagreement, or multiple groups that agree. Group factors can affect what the predominant leader will urge on the government, regime factors can influence what the single group will do, and leader characteristics may become important when multiple groups are making a decision. Some of the possible interrelationships have been described and discussed in C. A. Hermann and M. G. Hermann (1981). But there is much left to do. With the specification of the effects of these different sets of variables on each other, we will increase the importance of looking inside a government's 'black box' as we search for explanations of the nature of all foreign policy decisions.

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One final point: most discussions of foreign policymaking emphasize constraints on action, factors which impede policymaking or complicate implementation. Less attention has been given to what it is that drives a decision, to the question of which decision will be made. Although constraints affect whether or not a decision will be made, we must still ask what it is that helps us know what type of decision will be made if one is made. Looking inside the 'black box' at the leader or actors making foreign policy decisions can begin to provide an answer to this question. Leaders' orientations toward foreign affairs and regime orientations are two types of variables discussed in this chapter that alert us to the probable nature of the decision. It will be difficult to provide satisfactory explanations of foreign policy behavior if we cannot discover additional driving forces. Knowledge about constraints can only tell us *if* a decision is made; to explain foreign policy behavior, we need to know more about preferred modes of behaving.

We have tried in this chapter to suggest that it is worth looking inside the 'black box'. We can understand a government's foreign policy behavior much more adequately if we know something about who is involved in the making of foreign policy. Hopefully, we have piqued the reader's curiosity about the contents of the 'black box' because there is much left to be discovered and understood; we have only scratched the surface here. In the rest of the chapters in this book, the reader will learn more about the individuals and groups which make foreign policy decisions.

NOTES

The authors wish to thank the Mershon Center for its generous support during the past decade for much of the research described in this chapter. We also owe a debt of gratitude to the following individuals who have participated in extensive discussions about the question of how the domestic political process influences a government's foreign policy behavior: William Dixon; Joe Hagan; Valerie Hudson; Paul Lambert; Eric Singer; and Greg Sucilla.

- 1 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Stephen Walker's presentation in Chapter 5.
- 2 This research is described in more detail in Chapter 3.
- 3 This section builds on C. Hermann and M. Hermann

(1981) and C. Hermann, M. Hermann, and East (1980).

- 4 In this eighth decade of the twentieth century, researchers who concentrate on this aspect of the decisionmaking process must acknowledge numerous caveats derived from the insights of years of social science inquiry. Certainly, the act of choice is critically affected by the activities that precede it, including the identification and interpretation of the situation and the development and advocacy of one (or more) options. Moreover, the nature of the choice may be drastically altered by the manner in which the decision is interpreted by those who are supposed to implement it and assess its effects. Beyond that, we know that the act of choice may not always be a clean, definable point; instead, a consensus will sometimes gradually emerge (or be assumed to have emerged) without anyone consciously determining that 'now we must decide'. In some instances, there may be no decision at all, or the decision may cycle endlessly through its analytically separable stages (information gathering, followed by advocacy of an option, followed by a decision to gather more information or develop new options, followed by more information gathering, etc.). At other times, there may not be one decision, but numerous small incremental ones (perhaps made at different times and by different people). Furthermore, some may contend that this discussion assumes a rational or analytic approach to decisionmaking that often fails to correspond to what humans actually do. Despite all of these caveats, we believe that an extremely strong case can be made for focusing on the point of decision by assuming that a conscious act of choice occurs as the *usual* process and that important insights follows. However, rather than debate such issues in the abstract, we propose here one strategy for assigning responsibility for a decision and urge that it be compared to the major alternatives.
- 5 For another perspective on group structures and processes, see Semmel's discussion of small group phenomena in Chapter 4.
- 6 Another class of group variables that would unquestionably prove valuable in explaining group decisions concerns individual member preferences. Given the desire on the part of most researchers, however, to construct models that can be investigated empirically on a cross-national basis, we have not included this class of group variables here. The ability to acquire

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data on the positions of every member of a foreign policy decision group is extremely unlikely even in very open political systems.

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