BUNDY, WILLIAM PUTNAM

(*b.* September 24, 1917)

Assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs (1964–1969) during the period of U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War. Born in Washington, D.C., Bundy, the brother of McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, was educated at Yale College and Harvard Law School. After serving in the U.S. Army in Europe during World War II, he joined a prominent Washington law firm and from 1951 until 1960 worked for the Board of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 1960 he served as staff director for the Commission on National Goals. From 1961 to 1963 he held the positions of assistant secretary and undersecretary (October 1963) of defense for international security affairs. In February 1964 he transferred to the Department of State as assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. He served in that office until 1969, where he reinforced Secretary of State Dean Rusk's perception of the People's Republic of China as a major threat to Southeast Asia and resisted the improvement of relations with Beijing. In 1964 and 1965 he advocated continuing the war in South Vietnam, even if that required initiating U.S. bombing campaigns against North Vietnam and deploying increasing numbers of U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam. He hoped that these limited military actions would demonstrate the credibility of U.S. commitments around the world. Once the United States had shown its resolve, he argued, it might then withdraw with honor even if the Saigon government continued to suffer setbacks. Bundy remained a staunch defender of the domino theory in his public statements. From 1972 to 1984 he served as editor of *Foreign Affairs*, the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations. Bundy subsequently retired to Princeton, New Jersey, taught occasionally at the Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs and Public Policy, and worked on an analysis of the foreign policies of President Richard Nixon's administration.

STEPHEN E. PELZ

See also Bundy, McGeorge; Central Intelligence Agency; China; Rusk, David Dean; Vietnam War

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BUNKER, ELLSWORTH

(*b.* 11 May 1894; *d.* 27 September 1984)

Ambassador to South Vietnam (1967–1973) during the climax of the Vietnam War. Born in Yonkers, New York, and educated at Yale University, Bunker was the owner and manager of a sugar company that had holdings in Cuba and Mexico. Bunker began his career as an ambassador in 1951 by improving relations with Argentina during the time of Juan Perón, and in 1952 he served as ambassador to Italy. The next year he became president of the American Red Cross, a post he held until 1956, when he was named ambassador to India and Nepal, where he oversaw the expansion of the U.S. aid program. He remained ambassador to Nepal until 1959 and ambassador to India until 1961. In 1962 he negotiated the end of Dutch rule in West New Guinea, which became the West Irian province of Indonesia. In 1963 he helped to mediate a dispute between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over the Republic of Yemen. By this time he was known as the "Refrigerator" for his patience and inscrutability. In 1965, after U.S. troops intervened in the Dominican Republic against the leftist revolt led by Juan Bosch, Bunker headed a three-person team from the Organization of American States (OAS) that established a government friendly to the United States. From 1967 to 1973, as ambassador to South Vietnam, he presided over the Vietnamization program and attempted to induce the Vietnamese generals to create a representative government in Saigon. In 1970 he reluctantly backed the uncontested reelection of General Nguyen Thieu as president of South Vietnam. In his reports to Washington during these years, Bunker remained stubbornly optimistic about the prospects of winning the war, despite such setbacks as the Tet Offensive in early 1968. He served as ambassador-at-large from 1973 to 1978 and was the principal negotiator of the 1977 Panama Canal treaties, which gave the United States the right to defend the waterway but also agreed to pass on sovereignty over the canal to the Panamanians in the year 2000.

STEPHEN E. PELZ

See also Argentina; Dominican Republic; India; Indonesia; Panama and Panama Canal; Vietnam War; Yemen

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BUREAUCRACY

Organizations characterized by hierarchy of authority; definition of positions based on task requirements, rules, and regulations; and personnel recruitment and advancement based on technical expertise. During World War II numerous agencies conducting U.S. foreign policy were established or expanded; the proliferation of agencies continued after the war as the United States assumed a greater role in international affairs. The result has been

one of the most immediately apparent characteristics of U.S. foreign policy as conducted in the 1990s—a very large number of governmental organizations actively engaged in issues relating to foreign affairs. Foreign policy, therefore, often reflects the interplay and competition of these bureaucracies—each with distinctive missions and preferences.

The cast of organizational players includes some of the most familiar ones, such as the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the individual military services and Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council. One must then quickly add the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Peace Corps, the National Security Agency, the Export-Import Bank, the National Aeronautical and Space Administration, and a number of cabinet-level departments that have major divisions dealing with international affairs, including the Departments of the Treasury, Agriculture, Energy, Commerce, Labor, Justice, and Transportation. The multiplicity and centrality of government agencies in the conduct of foreign policy invites a number of questions from a bureaucratic perspective. How do they differ from one another? What drives and controls these agencies? What explains the so-called bureaucratic behavior of these organizations? When is change achieved?

Definitions

Although there is a tendency to regard modern governmental bureaucracy as a product of the nineteenth century, antecedents can be found throughout history, for example, in ancient Egypt or China. In Mesopotamia, Hammurabi (circa 1700 B.C.) delegated his authority to subordinates for the administration of his code when he was physically absent from a region, thus extending his control but also creating a differentiated administrative class. The pioneering scholarship of Max Weber (1864–1920), who viewed bureaucracies as agents for furthering rationality in Western societies, has exercised a lasting influence on those who examine such organizations. Features of Weber's ideal type definition of bureaucracy characterize agencies charged with conducting U.S. foreign policies. Hierarchy of authority is most evident in the structure of the military, with its command structures and officer ranks. It is also characteristic of civilian agencies such as the Department of State (as of 1994 the structure included the secretary of state, a deputy secretary, five undersecretaries, eighteen assistant secretaries, and so on). Specialization characterizes the CIA and other intelligence agencies, which are staffed by mathematicians (who make and break codes), computer specialists, economists, historians, photographic analysts, and other highly specialized professionals beyond the popular image of "secret agents." Rules and regulations as a defining characteristic of bureaucratic organizations is obvious to anyone who has applied for a passport. Personnel selection and advancement as determined by technical qualifications can be seen in the rigorous entrance examinations to the foreign service and the armed forces, along with highly specified criteria for advancement.

These four characteristics distinguish contemporary foreign and domestic bureaucracies from those forms of government administration based on political patronage, hereditary office, kinship, or tribal relations. In governments lacking bureaucratic structures, operations are routinely conducted using bribes, force of personality, or tradition. Weber's attributes differentiate modern organizational characteristics from other types of authority structures, but they do not clearly distinguish government bureaucracies from private corporations and other formal organizations, which often have some of the same features.

The sociologist James Q. Wilson suggests that the administrators of government bureaucracies operate under three constraints that distinguish them from their counterparts in the private sector. First, bureaucratic administrators typically cannot—at their own discretion—legally divert earnings of their organizations for the private benefit of their own employees or managers, as might be done elsewhere for incentives or bonuses. Second, for the most part, managers or executives of bureaucracies cannot allocate the resources as they might believe appropriate. Third, the leadership of such agencies normally must pursue organizational goals set by others. In the United States, foreign and domestic policy objectives are made by the president and his representatives or by Congress, not by the agencies charged with carrying them out.

The U.S. Congress can insist on (or deny) a pay raise for uniformed military personnel or members of the civil service, regardless of the judgment of the agency director or cabinet secretary. Private corporations raise capital by going to banks or investors and demonstrating that they can obtain a significant return on their investment. Along with all the other federal bureaucracies, agencies charged with the conduct of foreign affairs must seek appropriations annually from the Office of Management and Budget, representing the president, and then from the Congress, whose decisions seldom are based mainly on expected financial return. The leadership of a corporation may close an unprofitable plant, but the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff must go to Congress to close a military base. Because of perceived consequences for their constituencies, members of Congress may insist on keeping the base open regardless of costs. It is, however, often the bureaucracy that is held responsible for such inefficiencies.

What is most notable about these external controls or constraints over bureaucratic operation is that they are made by political actors drawing upon political considerations that differ from the economic ones in for-profit organizations. An episode from the Cold War in the history of the Department of State dramatizes the problems of political constraints. In the early 1950s Senator Joseph R. McCarthy corroded the effectiveness of many foreign service officers by charging in extensive public hearings and speeches that the department was infiltrated with communist sympathizers, security risks, and alien influences. Although most of his allegations were without evidence, he was successful in forcing the department to appoint his candidate as director of an internal security office. Investigations undertaken by the new director created a climate of caution among foreign service officers, who minimized initiatives and suppressed any proposals for dealing with international problems that might have caused them to be regarded with suspicion. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles decided that to conduct efficiently U.S. foreign policy during this period he would distance himself from the very department he was appointed to lead—a phenomenon that has repeated itself with other secretaries of state, who have discovered that their personal success can be disconnected from the effective administration of the department. Such a pattern may be understandable from the perspective of the individual secretary concerned with personal reputation and bent on addressing immediate foreign policy issues, but it undermines the more permanent bureaucratic structure, which, if properly used and led, should bring vastly greater resources than any one person can provide to the conduct of foreign policy.

When compared to other types of organizations, the existence of external political constraints on the leadership of foreign policy bureaucracies can generate anomalies. This structure, however, can ensure values important to a democratic society, such as accountability and equality of treatment.

Types of Bureaucracies

An agency's mode of operation and its power to influence its external political control depends upon its type. Wilson differentiates agencies whose activities can be observed from those whose operations are obscure, and agencies whose results are observable from those whose results are not. Based on the observability of activities and outcomes, Wilson identifies four kinds of bureaucracies: production (observable activities and outputs); procedural (observable activities, obscure outcomes); craft (obscure activities, observable outputs); and coping (both activities and outcomes are obscure). Although few agencies fit one category completely, most approximate one of them enough to provide revealing insights.

Production bureaucracies, with both observable activities and outcomes, are rare in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Some international assistance agencies, such as the Export-Import Bank, approximate the type. The bank promotes international trade and development through loans to U.S. and foreign private companies. Outsiders can observe the bank's activities, learning who gets loans and for what amounts and purposes. The outcomes also are visible: Was the pipeline or processing plant constructed? Was the loan repaid or did the borrower default? Did the company's foreign trade increase? Executives of production bureaucracies are likely to be careerists with technical expertise. This is a type of agency that wants to emphasize efficiency, for example, in showing what kind of return can be achieved on an investment. Such agencies are likely to shun activities and objectives that cannot be measured, preferring to concentrate on those for which they can demonstrate quality performance to outside authorities.

Procedural bureaucracies have observable activities but obscure outputs, as illustrated by the peacetime military. The task is to prepare for an outcome—victory in a war—that does not currently exist and obviously cannot be observed, but the peacetime preparations are observable: the acquisition of sophisticated equipment, training and practice, and the presentation of evidence of foreign threats. Unfortunately, the connection between the peacetime activities and the desired outcome remains uncertain. Observable procedures become emphasized and evaluated. The means (preparations) can end up being substituted for the ends. Standards for activities are of critical importance, and to maintain adherence to correct practice, professionalism and the development of standard operating procedures are encouraged.

If war occurs, military organizations shift abruptly into craft bureaucracies, in which victory or defeat (the outcome) may be clear, but the actions leading to it are obscured by the fog of war. In many other craft agencies, such as those engaged in intelligence gathering, observation of what workers do is difficult because of their isolation or independence rather than confusion and physical danger. The reputation of craft bureaucracies depends on the results they achieve. Precisely because the actions of individual agents remain hidden there is a worry about corruption or dishonorable practices. To guard against the difficulties, craft organizations seek to develop among their members not only professionalism but a personal commitment and loyalty to the organization and its mission. In the face of great personal risk, the crews of tanks, submarines, and bombers all need a dedication to each other and their mission.

Many foreign policy agencies can best be categorized as coping bureaucracies, those whose activities and outcomes lack observability. The Department of State fre-

quently approximates this condition. Diplomatic activity, representing the United States to others and reporting and assessing their response, is often conducted in secret or in the relative obscurity of distant places. With infrequent exceptions, negotiations are complex and involve compromises that make outcomes ambiguous. External appraisal is difficult in a tough negotiation. Did the ambassador really get the best deal possible? Did the other side really understand the message the secretary conveyed even though it professed publicly that it did not? For coping bureaucracies, the political support by which all government organizations operate tends to be based on a specific occasion where something appears to have gone wrong. Under such circumstances it is hard to sustain effective political constituencies, with the result that the reputation of such bureaucracies is often in question.

In summary, all bureaucracies operate under external political constraints, but they can be distinguished in ways that reveal something about their practices based on how well those that head the agency and those outside of it can observe what it does. When something can be observed, it can more readily be evaluated, leading either to support or opposition. Those in a position to engage in assessment must have an interest in exercising influence. For example, the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington distinguished between strategic and structural defense issues. Structural issues—such as the number of combat personnel or the location of military bases—are of intense interest to Congress because they can have immediate implications for their constituents. Congressional pressure and constraints on the Defense Department thus become very strong on structural issues. Strategic questions, such as the type of war to prepare for or the nature of a military alliance, may be very important to a few members of Congress who are either ideologically oriented or have made this one of their areas of substantive expertise, but for the most part, members of Congress are willing to let the president exercise primary control over such matters. Thus, there is an interaction between what is observable in a bureaucracy's work and what has political consequences for those able to regulate it.

Mission

The actions of bureaucracies can be understood not only by differentiating them by type, but also by their sense of mission. Some bureaucracies have a strong sense of the primary tasks that are the core purpose of the organization. To have a powerful effect on the behavior of the agency a sense of mission or organizational essence must be broadly shared among members of the bureaucracy. In some instances, a mission may center around an organizational technology and a belief about cause and effect. If a certain problem arises, members of the bureaucracy may share a belief about how their specific capabilities or technology can treat that problem. A sense of mission can have an important impact on what participants in the agency do and do not do.

Various military services or components of services in the U.S. armed forces have been characterized by a strong sense of mission. The Strategic Air Command (SAC), for example, developed a very strong sense of mission built around the development of the long-range bomber and the ability to deliver a retaliatory strike against the heartland of an enemy. The strong and widely held commitment to that mission enabled SAC to develop a loyalty among its people that resulted in an impressive dedication to their task, even under very difficult working conditions and despite tempting offers from civilian aviation. A sense of mission also provides the foundation for intense opposition, as when one bureaucracy acquires a task that is perceived to intrude on what those in another agency regard as their essential purpose. Its clear mission initially led the SAC to resist the development and acquisition of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), even though it could have meant greater budget allocations, more personnel, and expansion of other resources. Similarly, the air force vigorously opposed the development of submarine-launched ballistic missile capability after they had accepted ICBMs as part of their own core function.

A bureaucracy may have not just a single sense of mission, but several different missions. The navy, for example, has competing missions between the surface navy (which for a while was further divided between battleships and carriers) and submarines. The CIA has two competing missions: operatives engaged in the collection of information and other activities (often by clandestine means) and analysts engaged in the assessment of information. Competing missions within a bureaucracy can lead to major internal struggles and to efforts to get outside constituencies to ally with internal advocates of a preferred mission.

The Theory of Bureaucratic Politics

The pervasiveness of bureaucracies in the conduct of foreign policy has fostered the development of theory seeking to explain foreign policy in terms of bureaucratic politics. Rather than explaining foreign policy in terms of the international system or the actions or relative capabilities of foreign nations, the theory of bureaucratic politics seeks to explain foreign policy as it centers on the competition among bureaucracies within any one government. Many have contributed to the development of bureaucratic theories of foreign policy, but the political scientist Graham Allison unquestionably has had a dramatic influence on the popularity of such explanations. In his seminal work *Essence of Decision* (1971) he inter-

preted the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis in terms of three different frameworks, one of them bureaucratic politics. Although Allison's work has attracted numerous critics, it continues to generate considerable interest.

The tenets of a theory of bureaucratic politics can be summarized in a series of statements. Many governments have multiple, permanent agencies, ministries, or departments (i.e., bureaucracies) that deal with selected aspects of foreign and defense policy. Each of the bureaucracies has one or several basic missions and associated sets of interests that it strives to maintain and advance. Foreign policy problems are interpreted by those in each bureaucracy in terms of the mission and interests of that organization, and its leaders tend to believe that the resulting specification of the foreign policy problem in terms of their bureaucracy's interests closely parallels that of the entire government. The interests of various bureaucracies and their interpretations of problems often differ from one another. Most decision-makers and others influential in the policy process tend to be affiliated with one of the bureaucracies as career employees, political appointees assigned to the agency, or as consultants. Most of these decision-makers internalize the missions and interests of the bureaucracy with which they are associated or they receive substantial side payments to support those interests and therefore tend to see no conflict between their personal interests and those of their bureaucracy. Usually the power to establish a government policy and implement it are shared (not necessarily equally) among decision-makers representing different bureaucracies. With respect to most foreign policy problems the involvement and support (or nonopposition) of multiple bureaucracies is necessary; those representing the involved bureaucracies, however, are likely to interpret the problem differently and will prefer differing policies. In the absence of a powerful individual who can choose from among the competing interests and the varying approaches to a given foreign policy problem, the representatives of the bureaucracies must negotiate an acceptable compromise or face deadlock. Any resulting agreement is likely to entail a bargaining process involving mutual concessions, circumvention of differences, or trade-offs of one issue for another.

Bureaucratic politics theory stresses the conflict among dedicated representatives of multiple agencies pursuing different and sometimes directly competing interests. In the absence of a powerful leader who insists on a single approach, the multiple agencies remain in stalemate or resolve their differences by compromises. Compromises may fail to resolve differences or could lead to an unsatisfactory patchwork solution that may be unworkable.

Advocates of bureaucratic politics theory identify a variety of historical foreign policy cases that appear to conform to their explanations. For example, bureaucratic politics theory can be applied to the U.S. government to interpret the conflict between the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Departments of State and Defense. During the 1970s Congress directed AID to allocate more of its foreign assistance in developing countries to address the direct causes and effects of poverty—called the basic human needs approach. The intent was to assign more aid to specific village-level efforts to help people in dire need rather than award cash grants to friendly governments or to fund large-scale, splashy infrastructure projects such as harbors and airports. Other U.S. foreign policy bureaucracies favored the older practice of payments to governments whose support was needed to pursue diplomatic and strategic policies. Providing aid to reduce poverty and winning the cooperation of Third World governments for U.S. diplomatic initiatives were elements of U.S. foreign policy, but primary responsibility for each was assigned to different agencies. With respect to southern Africa, Caleb Rossiter documents the resulting series of unbalanced compromises triggered by this bureaucratic struggle that resulted in minimal commitments to fighting poverty. Bureaucratic explanations have been used to explain government actions in other countries as well. The emigré scholar Jiri Valenta interprets the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 as the eventual outcome of a long struggle between competing forces on the ruling Politburo of the Communist party of the USSR.

Critics of bureaucratic theory make various points, including the possibility of consensus rather than conflict among bureaucratic policymakers. By placing emphasis on consensus rather than conflict, Irving Janis advanced the alternative theory of groupthink, which occurs when group members such as representatives from different bureaucracies put agreement and group solidarity ahead of constructive debate about their differences. Other critiques of explanations grounded in bureaucratic politics contend that the theory too frequently neglects the impact of an authoritative leader (i.e., the president) or that it overstates the commitment that key players may have to a bureaucracy's perspective. Such criticisms may suggest the need for specifying the limiting conditions under which bureaucratic politics may operate.

Coping with Change

The theory of bureaucratic politics treats each episode of foreign policy as a distinctive occasion over which the agencies of government battle. It is precisely the struggles involving the task of reaching intragovernment agreements (characterized by the theory) that provide one of the reasons why bureaucracies are often seen as resisting change. Having forged the bruising compromises and the difficult coalitions necessary to adopt a

policy, participants are reluctant to change an agreement and start the process anew. If the agency has a strong sense of mission and the change challenges that mission's dominance, it will be opposed. If a strong performance of observable activities or outcomes by a procedural or production bureaucracy has resulted in the support of external constituencies, then a change that diverts attention to other tasks will be resisted. If the bureaucracy has an organizational "technology" captured in a set of well-established standard operating procedures, changes that disrupt that technology will lack support.

Nevertheless, the unqualified contention that bureaucracies always are an impediment to change certainly is incorrect. Government agencies can aggressively pursue change when it enhances a valued mission or makes more efficient or effective the realization of an observable procedure or outcome cherished by external constituencies and those political entities that control the agency. More fundamental change, concerning basic mission or new tasks and goals, poses greater difficulties for any organization, but under some conditions that are not well understood, profound change and innovation can transpire. The U.S. Marine Corps, for example, underwent a transformation into an assault amphibious warfare organization some time between the two world wars. Further study may reveal the importance of leadership, having a combination of vision and organizational skill, together with an environment that provides clear signals of the need for change without posing immediate crushing demands that absorb any organizational slack needed for freeing some talent to think and experiment.

The ability to cope with change in an inventive manner poses a particular problem to foreign policy bureaucracies in the post–Cold War world. The U.S. government, and many of its allies, developed a set of foreign and defense bureaucracies designed to meet the challenges of the international environment of the Cold War. The major bureaucracies of U.S. foreign and defense policy developed ways of handling the bipolar international system that featured one dominant military-political adversary. Various intelligence systems evolved to monitor and access the threat from the Soviet Union and its allies. Diplomats gradually became skilled at managing the repeated crises between East and West. The military developed an increasingly integrated military alliance with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies; they shaped technologies and strategies in conformity to the varying requirements of strategic deterrence.

In the post–Cold War world, the nature of threats and international problems will come from different sources, not necessarily military in nature. Issues as diverse as energy, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inadequately regulated international financial transfers, the massive movement of refugees, the terms of international trade, or the control of global communications may demand considerable, continuing attention from the government in the conduct of foreign policy. The United States must redefine its role in world affairs as it confronts a changing international environment. Such shifts are likely to create substantial strain on the present configuration of foreign policy and defense bureaucracies. Missions will be modified. New organizational technologies will be developed and adopted. Systems for detecting and monitoring new kinds of threats will be required. As a consequence some bureaucracies will undergo substantial change, others will shrink or disappear, and new bureaucratic agencies will emerge.

CHARLES F. HERMANN

See also Agency for International Development; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Defense, U.S. Department of; Export-Import Bank; Joint Chiefs of Staff; National Security Agency; National Security Council; Peace Corps; State, U.S. Department of

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BURKINA FASO

See Appendix 2

BURLINGAME, ANSON

(*b.* 14 November 1820; *d.* 23 February 1870)

Lawyer, member of Congress (1855–1861), and U.S. minister to China (1861–1867). Born in New Berlin, New York, Burlingame received a bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan and a law degree from Harvard University. As a Free Soiler and later a Republican congressman from