ırated in a series of case studies in Evans, Jacobson,

ʒ, see Goulding (1993) and Higgins (1993).

ʒories, with reference to the strategies employed by

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Epilogue: Reflections on Foreign Policy Theory Building

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Editors' Introduction

Charles Hermann here brings us back to the central concern of both generations of foreign policy scholars: building theory that can help us to explain and forecast *foreign policy. Within the context of this central concern, he critiques the second-generation scholarship presented in this book and considers the progress that has been made in foreign policy analysis, pointing to the spaces in which a third generation of scholarship might fruitfully arise. His perspective on this is unique and interesting given his standing as one of the premier foreign policy scholars. More importantly and more generally, he uses his chapter to help remind us that foreign policy scholarship must reflect the realities of—and the changes within—the international system. In this he brings us back to some of the issues raised by John Rothgeb in his context-setting chapter (chapter 3). Rothgeb suggested the ways in which World War II changed aspects of the international system perhaps permanently, changes that require us to look at the foreign policies of different groups of states in different ways. Similarly, Hermann asks us to consider the ways in which the end of the cold war has changed international politics, necessitating a change in the types of questions we must ask about foreign policy. He reminds us that our pursuit of theory in foreign policy will always be subject to revision by real-world changes in international politics and suggests that our task is to construct theories that can be flexible enough to accommodate such changes. Hermann also issues a warning to foreign policy analysts that we must get moving on this, lest we be left behind in the "tidal wave of change sweeping over world affairs."*

When reading this chapter, consider the following issues: What questions about the "new world order" (the post–cold war world) can be addressed within the context of the present scholarship? What questions cannot be adequately addressed using any of the frameworks established here? Given Hermann's views on change in the international system, can we ever build theories or laws if the international context can change in such fundamental



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

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ways as to leave our starting assumptions ungrounded? If you were to construct a new "conversational space" for a third generation of foreign policy scholarship, what issues would you include for discussion? ■

■ Predicting the End of the Cold War

Why didn't someone predict the ending of the cold war? Diplomatic historian John Gaddis poses exactly this question in a recent provocative essay (1992/93). Gaddis reviews the efforts of three groups of international relations theorists whose approaches he labels as behavioral, structural, and evolutionary. He finds each group's theoretical perspective flawed in ways that made the task unlikely to be achievable. In fact, Gaddis concludes that no member of any group forecasted the end of the cold war with recognizable accuracy.

In the spirit of the American late-night television talk show host, David Letterman, one might make a list of the "five best reasons" why no one predicted the particular ending of the cold war. A partial list might look like this:

1. We don't do predictions (see an astrologist, the CIA, or a futurist).
2. Policymakers blew it too. Why expect scholars to have done better?
3. No one seriously asked the question.
4. Systematic forecasting of discrete social phenomena is not possible.
5. We had the wrong theories.

We Don't Do Predictions

Gaddis goes to some length in his review to identify scholars in each of his clusters who claimed that forecasting, if not prediction, was an important purpose of developing theory about international relations. Yet it is remarkable how uncommon are theory-based predictions in the study of foreign policy and international relations. Certainly prescriptive essays occasionally advance a dire picture of future developments if the advocated course is not followed. (Example: If North Korea is allowed to develop nuclear weapons, Japan also will become a nuclear power.) Moreover, systematic forecasts are somewhat more likely in world affairs when they can draw on theory and data outside of the domain of international politics, such as actuarial or demographic data. (Example: Major change will occur in China after the present leadership dies; or the AIDS epidemic will drastically alter the population of Africa in the next decade.) Such forecasting contrasts sharply with the silence of scholars drawing on theories of international relations. Indeed in his review, Gaddis often has to extrapolate from hypotheses and arguments of international relations scholars to formulate their assumed interpretation about the cold war. It is probably fair to say that most academic researchers dealing with foreign policy and international relations do not undertake their studies with the purpose of being able to make an informed forecast about some phenomenon at its conclusion.[1]

Policymakers Blew It, Too

In general, that seems to be true. The way the cold war ended seems to have caught almost everyone by surprise. In contrast to academic scholars, various agencies in the U.S. government and in other governments are given the task of making forecasts about certain kinds of events. Groups in the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury, and, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency are quite accustomed to making forecasts. Often these are of a short-term nature, but when it comes to determining what weapons to acquire and how to configure future forces, there is a requirement for long-term forecasting of the international strategic environment. It is certainly a case of "cold tea for hard times," however, to conclude that theories and insights from experiences of the policy community used by government analysts did no better than those of scholars.

No One Asked the Question

The primary concern of most researchers—academics or policy analysts—was whether the cold war would turn hot. The future-oriented question that received extensive attention was the possible conditions that might trigger war between the United States and the Soviet Union or their respective allies. Studies were frequent of the circumstances leading to deterrence failure, crisis escalation, or the accidental unintended outbreak of war. Such inquires were not necessarily driven by the question: Is this the most likely way the cold war will end? Instead, in the spirit of worst-case analysis, escalation represented the class of outcomes that were widely regarded as the most disastrous—the most costly—and, therefore, the ones that we should strive to understand so that preventive steps could be taken.

Systematic Forecasts Are Not of Discrete Events

A distinction needs to be drawn between predictions and forecasts. In a rigorous definition, prediction is understood to specify the exact conditions that will always yield a specified outcome (if, and only if, A occurs, then B occurs). Few would claim that theory-based statements about future human social occurrences can take that form. A forecast, demonstrated in everyday life by weather prognostications made by meteorologists, is grounded in probability thinking. Even when formal probability reasoning is not engaged, a forecast is stated in terms of the conditions that make a particular class of occurrences more or less likely rather than the specification of the necessary and sufficient conditions. Thinking in terms of likelihoods (forecasts) establishes a different context than predictions.

Forecasts suggest that on some occasions one outcome will occur, while in others it will not, even though all the occasions have the same prior specified conditions. In other words, forecasts require one to be able to imagine a range of outcomes. If one conceptualizes a historical event in all its particulars as unique, then a "forecast" of that exact set of historical circumstances is not a reasonable expectation. Instead, we must generalize to a class of events (e.g., elections, wars, trade agreements) in

which various specific outcomes can be grouped. Thus, a forecast of the ending of the Soviet-American cold war would require us to define it as one instance of a class of phenomenon that occur repeatedly. If one can imagine repeating the same sequence of significant events leading to the end of the cold war multiple times—in much the same way as Margaret Hermann and I did in the simulation of the outbreak of World War I (Hermann and Hermann 1967)—would it end every time with the largely peaceful collapse of the Soviet empire and the regime itself? More likely, there would be a range of outcomes—sometimes a coup d'état, sometimes a civil war, sometimes an external war, sometimes a revolution, and so forth. It might be that in the class of all possible international system–transforming events, as in the simulation of such occurrences, the peaceful implosion of one of the major powers is an extremely unlikely event. If so, analysts might not be harshly criticized for failing to forecast an event whose likelihood was remote.

We Had the Wrong Theories

In evaluating why the nature of the cold war's conclusion was not anticipated, all the previous arguments (and some others as well) deserve review. But the question of wrong or inadequate theories is particularly intriguing to consider at the conclusion of a book on conceptualizations and theory development in foreign policy. Inadequate theories, together with methodological constraints, lie at the heart of John Gaddis's (1992/93) critique as well. Most of the theories that Gaddis evaluated with reference to the ending of the cold war are broad and inclusive in scope. For the most part they were not constructed to explain or forecast the conclusion or transformation of bipolar international systems. Most people would probably accept the argument that it is far more difficult—at least at this point in human intellectual development—to construct either accurate explanations or forecasts from a general, all-purpose, time-insensitive theory of collective political actions than one tailored to account for a specific type of occurrence in a defined set of historical conditions.

General international theories can be critiqued on other grounds as well. Gaddis effectively argues that several of them lack adequate treatment of dynamics and change. There is a general lack of attention to dynamic processes and to the conditions that precipitate significant change as opposed to stability. "It is ... the case that we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity ... we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory or attempt to determine what causes them to happen" (Gaddis 1992/93, 52).

Furthermore, international relations theories also can be seen as deficient for their failure to give adequate attention to domestic politics and the internal factors within countries that may powerfully shape their role in international affairs. From the vantage point of hindsight it is difficult to interpret the end of the cold war without examining the internal conditions within the Soviet Union—the ruptured economy, the political alienation, and erosion of the will of state officials, and so forth. In brief, the major international relations theories available to Gaddis were deficient exactly in the area of primary concern to foreign policy analysts. This deserves further consideration. It is the contention of this essay that as scholars reflect on the end of the cold war, they increasingly recognize that international relations theories must introduce domestic considerations from within nations. This

realization gives additional significance to theoretical work on foreign policy analysis that has concentrated on domestic factors.

■ Challenges to Theory Development from the Ending of the Cold War

The termination of the cold war has released an avalanche of criticism of the ability of existing theories to explain its ending. If most scholars have not been concerned about the predictive capabilities of their theories, they have raised questions about their explanatory power. The prevailing theories of international politics—realism or its more recent formulations known as neorealism or structural realism—have been primary targets. Using these theories is it possible to explain the dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy in the late 1980s under Gorbachev (i.e., accepting the zero-option in INF, unilateral troop withdrawals, asymmetrical cuts in strategic arms agreements, declining to use force to protect East European regimes, etc.)? Furthermore, can they explain the cautious response of the West to these initiatives? A variety of scholars conclude that these theories at best are indeterminant; taken alone they cannot account for the timing or the direction of the changes. Although scholars differ in their proposed amendments or alternative theoretical concepts that should be added, those examining the issue agree that it is necessary to take into account the internal structures and processes in the societies involved. As Risse-Kappen observes: "To understand the revolution in Soviet foreign policy and the various Western responses to it which together brought the cold war to an end, one cannot ignore domestic politics and leadership beliefs" (1994, 193).

Realists themselves have always acknowledged a modest role for domestic factors. Thus Waltz notes that domestic factors affect foreign policy but that the international system's "pressures of competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal pressures" (1986, 329). More recently, readers may find a slightly more generous tone in Waltz's recurrent references, written after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to the constraints and opportunities that the changing international structure affords certain states, but he notes whether and when they respond to these shifting conditions depends upon their policy choices. He concludes that "foreign-policy behavior can be explained only by a conjunction of external and internal conditions" (Waltz 1993, 79).

In the context of this shifting intellectual emphasis one finds major new works such as *Myth of Empire* (Snyder 1991) that seeks to explain why great powers often tend to overextend their international ambitions to the point where their costs outstrip any gains. To explain the five cases he examines, Snyder primarily draws upon theories of domestic politics in which narrow interests capture government policy for their own benefit—while disguising their purpose in "myths of empire" propaganda to the general public that must assume the costs. Snyder's work triggers criticism from structural realists who contend he has gone too far and given inadequate attention to systemic factors. Thus in his review, Zakaria writes "He [Snyder] should have begun by separating the systemic causes of state behavior from the domestic ones" (1992, 196–97).

It is not only in the critiques of structural realism's explanations that one finds greater attention given to the integration of international structure and domestic poli-

tics. The ending of the cold war has underscored two other related developments. First, there is now a greater interest in explaining cooperative behavior rather than the earlier more exclusive attention given to the causes of hostilities and war. Second—and linked in some important respects to the first—there is a greater concern with international economic activity. Clearly both these areas of intellectual inquiry were well established during the cold war, but its demise has pushed them more directly into the center of the theoretical concerns of international relations theorists.

Studies of international cooperation took as their point of departure the nature of the interaction among independent international actors. Thus, Axelrod's (1984) major initiative considered alternative strategies that one negotiating party might pursue to reward or punish its counterpart, while also signaling a desire to continue cooperation rather than engage in a prolonged cycle of reciprocal defections. Putnam's (1988) metaphor of the two-level game expanded thinking about cooperation by suggesting that each international negotiator struggles to reach an agreement (cooperation) while balancing the requirements of their domestic constituents with those of the other international actor. Thus the negotiators are engaged in two connected "games," one domestic and the other international. Success or cooperation is determined by being able to settle on an agreement that is in the "win-set" of the players at both levels. In other words, Putnam seeks to explain international cooperation as the function of both international and domestic factors. A subsequent series of case studies (Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993) designed to probe the plausibility and range of two-level game phenomena affirmed not only the potential explanatory importance of both domestic and international political considerations but also the distinctive role that governmental leaders play in integrating the forces from those two levels: "The image of the state leaders as 'Janus-faced,' forced to balance domestic and international concerns, stands at the core of the integrative approach, making it 'state centric,' not in the realist sense of emphasizing nation-states as units but in the sense of seeing chief executives, and state bureaucracies more generally, as actors whose aims cannot be reduced to reflections of domestic constituent pressure" (Evans 1993, 401–2).

These case studies of domestic factors in international negotiation also provide insight into some of the post–cold war changes that might flow from the altered mix of issue areas. For many countries after the cold war, foreign economic issues may displace security matters as the domain most frequently engaging vital interests. If this is so, distinctions between most security-type issues and those that are primarily economic become important. Thus, for example, Evans suggests that "territorial conflicts between long-term military adversaries are least likely to evoke complex domestic divisions," but, by contrast, "bargains about trade, investment, and labor flows may evoke bitter distributional contention" (1993, 424–25). He proposes that such differences in the domestic dynamics of security and economic issues may alter the structure of international negotiations. Cooperative agreements may be more likely for economic matters if multiple issues are linked, permitting synergistic strategies on which tradeoffs between the parties permits everyone to win on some issues while accepting losses on others.

Such an argument rests on two broad assumptions—first, that the end of the cold war may change the mix of economic and security issues that figure centrally in the international concerns of some nations and, second, that economic and security issues often invoke different kinds of domestic political dynamics that in turn affect the process of international agreements. For our purposes, the argument—which certainly requires further exploration—illustrates yet another way in which the end of the cold war is changing both international affairs and scholarship about it. Such changes underscore the importance of constructing explanations that integrate domestic factors with international phenomena.

Even in the theoretical explanation of security issues, and most particularly studies of the sources of international war, there is new interest in introducing domestic considerations. Two recent attempts to consider how domestic factors contribute to the explanation of war were undertaken by Levy (1989) and Schweller (1992). Schweller contributes to what has become a major area of recent international scholarship, the possible relationship between regime type and the engagement in interstate war. With the waning of the cold war, the world has experienced what Huntington (1991) has described as a third wave of experimentation with democratic forms of government in countries that previously had experienced authoritarian rule. Associated with this international development has been a renewed interest in the relationship between democracies and war, reformulated as the hypothesis that democracies are less likely to fight wars with other democracies. As one of the authors in this volume notes, the hypothesis weakens when the dependent variable, interstate war, is stretched to suggest democracies pursue a more pacific form of foreign policy generally, but in its narrower form the empirical results are intriguing. The general research interest in democracy and war further highlights the renewed interest in seeking to understand international behavior at least in part by reference to internal features of countries.

Russett (1982) anticipated this need to pay more attention to domestic factors in explanations of international phenomena when more than a decade ago he reviewed the accumulated quantitative research in two areas that had generated substantial inquiry. In the literature on both arms races and dependency, he concluded that studies were more likely to find significant relationships between the international phenomena examined if the researchers introduced domestic factors as mediating variables. "The implications of this will not necessarily please 'realists,' and they will be more satisfying to students of comparative foreign policy than to students of international systems" (Russett 1982, 12). His conclusions explain the reasons for this observation. "We do find generalizations and regularities, but they are complex, interactive, heavily conditioned. Clearly they show the importance of detailed country-specific knowledge" (Russett 1982, 19).

More recently, Zakaria has suggested that the scope and specific accuracy one seeks from theory may influence the extent to which domestic factors need to be taken into account. "The parsimony of systemic theory is useful for some purposes, but more accurate theories are far more useful for many other purposes. Domestic politics explanations can be more useful in explaining events, trends, and policies that are too specific to be addressed by a grand theory of international politics" (Zakaria 1992, 198).

A New Round of Foreign Policy Theory Development

It would be unfair to say that the contributors to this volume are oblivious to the international developments that have rocked the study of international politics. They are certainly aware of the changes that have led a number of scholars and analysts who previously concentrated almost exclusively on international structures and processes to reexamine the predictive and explanatory power of their theories and to look anew at the dynamics within countries. The specific reference point for this volume, however, is neither the actual collapse of the cold war nor the repercussions it has triggered among theory-oriented scholars of international politics. It is nevertheless useful to ask whether the recent work in foreign policy reflected in this volume can help fill the intellectual gap now emerging in international politics. To that end, it is important to review the efforts represented by this volume on their own terms.

For the most part the point of departure for the editors and contributors is the earlier work of a group of primarily American foreign policy theorists who collectively identified themselves as "comparative foreign policy" scholars. The collection of review essays and advocacy pieces that constitute this volume seek to correct, extend, or revise these earlier undertakings. What must not be overlooked is the major commitment these authors share with their predecessors. The common property is a commitment to promote a theory-driven field of foreign policy that is empirically grounded. Although the purpose of such theory is largely unexpressed in these pages, one of the editors concludes her own essay by referring to "the baseline criteria of any theory ... high explanatory and predictive value" (Neack, chapter 13 in this volume). There is a further shared position that theory must be substantiated by (the editors' introduction states "informed by") systematic empirical analysis. Furthermore, Moon in his chapter (chapter 11) refers to the need for a "stringent empirical test," and Schrodt's entire chapter (chapter 9) is devoted to developments in one kind of empirical data. But a commitment to methodological openness constrains any consensus among the contributors on the test procedures for determining the fit between theory and the reality it is intended to explain or forecast.[2] Equally noteworthy and reasonable is the willingness to persist with a theory because of the absence of an alternative explanation, even when repeated empirical analysis by one set of procedures fails to confirm its expectations. Thus Hey's chapter (chapter 12) shows how dependency hypotheses should not be dismissed despite unimpressive results from earlier quantitative studies. Regardless of their reservations about the adequacy of any particular methods for establishing goodness of fit between a theory and aspects of actual foreign policy activity, these scholars share with earlier investigators an insistence on empirical grounding of theory.

Beyond this shared foundation, it is tempting to summarize in pop journalism fashion the differences the contributors perceive between themselves and the earlier comparative foreign policy analysis:

What's out

Hegemony of positivism

Realism[3]

General or grand theory

Parsimony

What's in

Multilevel, multicausal explanations

Contextuality

Middle-range theories

Bridging to other fields

Behind the slogans and shorthand phrases, of course, are real issues that bear significantly on the attempts to contribute to an understanding of foreign policy. For that reason, a closer examination of the current direction of theory construction is essential.

Multilevel, Multicausal Explanations

The careful reader will have noted that the chapters in this volume follow a rough sequence introducing different levels and kinds of explanation. They begin with an overview of the international system (Rothgeb) and then move back to the individual decision maker (Rosati and Shimko), the group, bureaucracy, and institution (Ripley and Haney), political organization or opposition (Hagan), the state (Moon and Neack), and society (Peterson). Each of these chapters offers an inventory of potential explanatory variables, competing hypotheses, or alternative theories. Thus, the reader interested in explanatory variables can consider the different techniques of comparison—including analogies and metaphors—that humans use to interpret new, unfamiliar situations (Shimko) or alternative ways women and roles have been specified in nationalist movements (Peterson). Competing empirical hypotheses are advanced by Neack on democratic states and war, while Hey offers different hypotheses about the expected foreign policy behavior of dependent states. Rosati reviews alternative theories of cognitive processes; Moon focuses on alternative theories of the state.

There can be little doubt about the varied and rich menu of multilevel conceptual products introduced in this volume. It is the next step that is so daunting. How are variables, hypotheses, or even theories from different analytical levels to be integrated into more complete explanations? This is not a new problem in the study of foreign policy. Rosenau (1966) in his pre-theories essay sought to do it by a kind of reductionism, that is, he argued that the relative importance (potency) of different levels of explanation would vary depending on the type of nation-state. Different levels of explanation could be reduced to a primary one depending on the nation-type. Wilkenfeld and his associates (1980) attempted to integrate variables from multiple levels to explain foreign policy behavior using a statistical process (partial least squares mode). Alker and Bennett (1977) sought a multilevel foreign policy synthesis through a computer simulation using a complex set of contingency decision rules. It is easy to see that none of these efforts were entirely satisfactory. The contributors of this volume appear to be on very solid ground in arguing that adequate theories of foreign policy must in all likelihood integrate multiple, interrelated sources of explanation

drawn from different levels of analysis. Of course, one might ask whether the requirements of theory might depend upon what is to be explained or forecasted. More on that point later.

Contextuality

The phrase "contextuality" captures ideas expressed in various ways in this volume, for example, cultural sensitivity, gender sensitivity, contingency analysis, issue and domain specification. The argument is that our explanations must be bounded and qualified. (This is exactly the point made by Russett in 1982.) Presumably, these applicable conditions must be specified by the researcher. I might have titled this section "Farewell Ceteris Paribus" because a large portion of social science research has involved the exploration of hypotheses in which investigators consciously prefaced the stipulated relationship with the caveat "other things being equal." Of course, the difficulty is that in human affairs, all other things beyond their stated relationship are almost never equal at all times and places. The researchers examining an ad hoc hypothesis without stipulating the boundary conditions, the appropriate context, the externalities to which the relationship is sensitive can arguably be said to be engaged in intellectually irresponsible behavior. The contributors seem justified in criticizing much earlier empirical research—including, particularly, that studying comparative foreign policy—for devoting so much effort to the examination of ad hoc hypotheses devoid of any specification of context.

It is possible to read this entire book as a series of candidates for boundary setting, qualifying, or mediating variables. Readers are encouraged to recognize differences among kinds of situations (e.g., crisis versus noncrisis), international systems, actors (including nonstate actors), actor strategies, political opposition, states, bureaucratic cultures, and so on. There can be little doubt that such distinctions—and many others—can be critical in certain policy explanations. We are discovering, for example, that when women are responsible for designing international population control policies and practices, their approach is different from that favored when men dominated population policy. A hypothesis about the effects of micro financial loans to aspiring individual entrepreneurs would at least in some cultures yield different results if controlled for gender. (Women are more successful.) In other words, as Peterson argues, in some areas women approach international problems and behave differently from men. In this example, as in all other matters concerning sensitivity to context, the challenge is to determine which contextual properties must be considered and when.

In his chapter Ripley states, "A model helps an analyst interpret a complex real-world phenomenon (such as foreign policy decision making), identify the most important features, and understand how those features are interrelated." As with a model, a theory or a set of hypotheses must be selective in specifying the included components. It must select from all possible elements in the environment, which ones are likely to impinge in a substantial way on the examined relationships. Individual researchers and teams of researchers should be implored to be more contextually sensitive in their studies, but in all likelihood we will continue to depend on a community of scholars to help each other out. Others, who approach a problem from different perspectives, can test amendments to earlier work to see if the results

are stable or are altered by the introduction of different variables. The chapters by Moon and Hey in this volume are two examples of exactly that process.

Middle-Range Theories

What should it be? Broad, all-encompassing theories? Micro, extremely restricted theories? Middle-range theories? This scope requirement for theory development is rather more difficult to specify. In one way it might be interpreted as a vague reaction to earlier efforts to develop theories of foreign policy activity that claimed—explicitly or implicitly—to have universal applicability. The argument might be that since those efforts seem to have offered rather poor explanations, we should be more modest in our aspirations. This could be regarded as simply another statement of the need for greater attention to contextuality.

Another way to interpret the call for middle-range theories is to be more specific about the kind of activity to be explained, that is, the dependent variables. Long ago I engaged in a critique of theoretical efforts in foreign policy for being remarkably vague about what was to be explained (C. Hermann 1978b). Except for a substantial body of research on the causes of war that includes scholarship from foreign policy, international politics, and other numerous fields, studies of foreign policy often neglect to specify the kind of foreign policy to be explained—military interventions, trade agreements, sanctions, scientific cooperation on joint projects, diplomatic recognition, peacekeeping initiatives, and so on.[4] Seldom are these or any of hundreds of alternative ways of characterizing foreign policy activity incorporated into theoretical efforts. The event data effort (whose resurgence is well described in this volume by Schrodt) was undertaken in part to develop measurable ways to characterize different kinds of foreign policy activity. Sadly, the marriage between the empirically grounded indicators of foreign policy behavior and efforts at constructing foreign policy theories has been extremely slow to occur. Certainly, there is absolutely no requirement that the dependent variables of any foreign policy theory must be specified in terms of concepts that can be operationalized as events. Far from it. That, however, does not eliminate the necessity for theorists to make clear what is to be explained. By doing so the theorist moves a considerable way down the path toward establishing the scope of the theoretical effort. An attempt to explain pacifist activity of all international actors certainly is a broader-ranging theory than one limited to understanding interstate wars, which in turn is broader than one concerned only with wars between global powers. Thus the breath of coverage included in the dependent variable can be used to create middle-level theory.

Several efforts in this volume explore hypotheses with specified kinds of foreign policy as the dependent variable. Neack in her chapter takes a critical look at the considerable research activity going on around the hypothesis that democracies are less likely to engage in war with one another. Hey contends that one polity's dependency on another can result in one of several specified kinds of foreign policy behavior (e.g., compliance). Moving from hypotheses to more inclusive theories that designate certain behaviors, we have the example of Rosati's account of the cognitive revolution involving a shift from cognitive consistency theories to social cognition and schema theories. These developments in cognitive theory suggest, among other things, how belief systems affect us as individual problem solvers. The implication for

those who wish to explain the decision making of foreign policy leaders is clear and exciting. But Rosati cautions that results from empirical studies attributing certain foreign policy behaviors (presumably what we wish to understand) to different belief structures is quite mixed. In his conclusions Rosati proposes that differences in the type of situation (e.g., whether the problem is familiar or the degree of uncertainty) may affect the power of schema theory to account for behavior. That is an example of the contextual sensitivity noted previously.

These illustrations do not exhaust the current efforts to define theoretical scope by specifying the type of behavior to be explained. Unfortunately, however, they remain the exceptions rather than the rule. As in the past, we witness too many efforts that proclaim another variable or class of variables that will improve our ability to explain undifferentiated "foreign policy." Theory, particularly the specification of middle-range theory, demands more. Those of us concerned with theoretical development in foreign policy must do more to stipulate the foreign policy problem, puzzle, or behavior we seek to explain and how proposed variables contribute to it.

Bridging to Other Fields

The idea that the field of foreign policy is a conceptual bridge can be quite instructive. Within the discipline of political science, the need to make connections between comparative politics (the study of politics within countries) and international politics (the study of politics among countries) seems as obvious as it is neglected. Rosenau (1969b), among others, has stressed the desirability of a "linkage politics" that conceives of foreign policy as the bridge between domestic and international politics.[5] In her chapter, devoted far more to breaking new conceptual ground than reviewing ongoing research, Mingst picks up Rosenau's challenge by suggesting a typology of actors that creates a bridge between internal and external constituencies. She also describes the various strategies available to them. (Her chapter is an open invitation for someone to specify the conditions that might indicate when different actors might pursue alternative strategies.)

The editors are not far from the mark, in my judgment, in suggesting earlier foreign policy research borrowed the approach of comparative politics (i.e., a focus on cross-national studies and the use of comparative methods) but incorporated remarkably little of the substantive domain. Hagan's chapter vividly demonstrates the potential gain to be made in foreign policy by working more directly with the concepts and variables of domestic politics. He hints at the possible use of coalition theory, which for some puzzling reason has not yet attracted strong interest in foreign policy. Peterson's discussion of nationalism and Neack's examination of the classification of states also draw on work in comparative politics and underscore the field's importance to foreign policy.

Bridging, or more precisely borrowing, from other domains is not limited to other fields in political science. The reader finds both Moon and Hey drawing on political economy, Ripley and Haney using organizational and institutional concepts, Gerner and Schrodt introducing artificial intelligence and information theory, Rosati and Shimko working with material from cognitive psychology. Looking at this book one could almost characterize foreign policy analysts as a band of intellectual thieves stealing ideas from almost everyone!

It is perhaps notable that this volume includes only one chapter devoted directly to possible insights from the study of the international system.[6] Rothgeb's thesis that at least two parallel international systems are emerging and that the dominant foreign policy behaviors in each are quite different suggests the importance of looking more carefully in this direction for an understanding foreign policy. Many of the international politics scholars whose work was noted at the outset of this chapter are looking to domestic factors to condition their international explanations. It is a wonder that foreign policy analysts, from their different perspectives, do not more often look to international factors to condition their expectations about foreign policy.

■ Conclusions: Theory Trek, the Next Generation

In their introduction to this volume the editors note that earlier scholarship on building foreign policy theory was influenced by the cold war and other aspects of the international environment (e.g., the number of new nations that emerged in the 1960s and the associated concern with economic development). The ending of the cold war is one of the most profound changes in international affairs in the twentieth century. It will influence future scholarship.

In the first part of this chapter I have suggested that scholars concerned with theories about the international system appear to be engaged in serious reexamination of their work as a result of the cold war collapse. Interestingly, theoretical inquiry in foreign policy—at least as reflected in this volume—has not yet given much attention to the implications of this systemic transformation for their undertakings. The major exception is Rothgeb's chapter, and, of course, his subject is the international system.

As in the past, it seems likely that future scholarship of foreign policy analysts will address the changes in the worlds they study. This seems particularly so since the recent changes have resulted to a significant degree from domestic factors within countries and their effects on the foreign policies nations have pursued. (At least that is one of the conclusions from international relations theorists, as I interpreted them, at the beginning of this chapter.) My guess is that the impact on foreign policy theory of the cold war's end and the surge in economic issues will occur long before another scholarly generation appears. How might these international developments affect some of the themes and emphases about theory captured in this book?

Certainly one likely result is more incorporation of change and dynamics in theories of foreign policy. Concern for when and how policies might change is not a central theme in the contributions to this volume. In fact, the editors include a footnote in their introductory chapter acknowledging change is not one of the subjects that is included. But their concern with specifying context and incorporating variables from multiple levels invites attention to time and the effects of the dynamic interplay of variables on policy. Yet more direct treatment seems essential, not just as a separate chapter on when states and other actors change direction but as an integral part of any theoretical formulation.

It is noteworthy that one of the late Karl Deutsch's most direct efforts to contribute to foreign policy theory, *The Nerves of Government* (1966), sought to deal with change. Somewhat later Steinbruner (1974) took a different approach to cybernetics

to address some of the same issues. Neither study seems to have served as a springboard for much continuing effort. Perhaps the time has arrived to revisit the concerns that drove their initiatives.

I have argued that theory-inclined scholars of international politics have rediscovered domestic politics. Their interest in incorporating variables and theories about politics within countries may well be reciprocated as foreign policy analysts come to grips with the post–cold war world. After all, we have observed the strong disposition of contemporary foreign policy analysts to bridge and borrow. To make this connection, however, those of us in foreign policy scholarship will be required to accept one critical assumption. We already treat it as a central feature of our daily accounts of foreign policy, and it energizes our classroom discussions and conversations with colleagues, but we do not incorporate it as a major feature in most theories of foreign policy.

The assumption is simply that foreign policy is extremely responsive to the actions and statements of other international actors. Of course! This, after all, is the core of international politics. Conceptually the central position of interaction or exchange in international relations theory may be an obstacle for foreign policy analysts. There may be a tendency to think that if we examine the interaction of actors we are dealing with international politics, not foreign policy.

How does one create an interactive theory that takes the perspective of an actor in the system, rather than that of the system itself, while at the same time taking into account that the actor is constantly responding to perceived external feedback to its prior actions, new initiatives of others, differing situations, and shifts in the international structure? We must address the question. This must be done while including in the theory the internal dynamics that the contributors to this volume effectively illustrate. I think this is parallel to the question that some international relations theorists are approaching from the opposite direction as they review their theories after the cold war. The press for better explanations is likely to push foreign policy analysts in a similar manner.

In this regard it is instructive that Schrodt includes in his chapter a quote from Charles McClelland, the early pioneer in event data, that includes the observation: "We were defeated, however, in the attempt to categorize and measure event *sequences*" (italics added). McClelland is acknowledging the great difficulty of creating reliable and valid chains of action and reaction—the essence of foreign policy as a sequence of exchanges. This underscores what may be a more difficult problem in both theory and data for foreign policy than for international relations theory. Foreign policy theorists are more likely to want to understand differentiated kinds of near-term interaction (e.g., the responses to a specific kind of move) rather than patterns of interaction that develop over extended periods of time. Although the task may be difficult, the requirement may be the key to better explanations and forecasts.[7]

The question posed by John Gaddis with which this chapter began illustrates another way in which future theory in foreign policy may evolve. Gaddis's question about prediction emerged from what was, for him, a puzzle. He observed all the interest in theory in international politics as compared to the modest attention it receives in history. He puzzled over the question of whether more attention to theory

makes for better predictions. Similar questions or puzzles seem to drive much of the theoretical work of our international relations colleagues. Thus, Snyder (1991) asks why major powers so often seem to engage in destructive overextension. Waltz (1993) asks, if economic issues become more predominant in the post–cold war, will the international system be less competitive? Questions, puzzles, or problems seem less often to motivate theoretical efforts in foreign policy analysis. If they are asked, the questions are remarkably unfocused and are seldom followed with a thesis or hypothesis as a possible answer. Too often, I believe, we still are only advocating the addition of new explanatory variables to the list of sources for undifferentiated foreign policy.

But the major changes occurring in world affairs are likely to stimulate the formulation of questions and puzzles in foreign policy as in international relations. Furthermore, the commitment to middle-level theory expressed repeatedly in this volume may be promoted by concentrating theoretical efforts on the treatment of puzzles and problems that lead to well-formulated questions. We can limit the focus of a theory by designating specific foreign policy activity and by sharpening the research question it is intended to answer.

This book has suggested some emerging patterns or trends among those who have joined the effort to construct theories of foreign policy. I have observed that a tidal wave of change in world affairs is sweeping over all of us. As we react to our evolving international environment, it will shape our thinking and interact with some of the theoretical patterns captured in this volume. These changes may stimulate additional, new, exciting efforts to explain and forecast the foreign policies of international actors.

Notes

1. In fact, description, prescription, and explanation of singular policy occurrences are most often the purpose of foreign policy analyses rather than theoretically driven work from which more general explanations and forecasts might be derived.

2. I suspect there might be disagreement among the contributors to this volume on the nature of appropriate empirical evidence and how it should be related to theory. Clearly the opposite side of the coin for the advocated new methodological openness is a lack of consensus among different foreign policy analysts on how theories are to be substantiated.

3. Realism and structural realism are the objects of repeated reference and critique in this volume. What is remarkable is the virtual absence of any attention to rational choice theory as an alternative conceptual approach to foreign policy and international relations. The important ongoing work in this area is almost totally ignored. One example of how developments in this area are affecting theoretical work in foreign policy is provided by Bendor and Hammond (1992).

4. There are articles and books devoted to these and other kinds of foreign policy activity, but few are directly concerned with the development of a theory that explains when and why they occur.

5. Recognition of the need to connect comparative and international politics is not new. A conference devoted to this topic at Northwestern University resulted in Farrell's (1966) volume in which Rosenau's "pre–theories" essay appeared.

6. Admittedly, several contributors touch on features of the international system and might have developed its characteristics further in fuller studies, but Rothgeb is the only one presently to explore its impact directly.

7. Efforts to study reciprocity in both foreign policy and international relations have resulted in some recent attempts to identify action-reaction sequences, but success at capturing specific chains of interaction among actors, particularly those involving more than two countries, has still been elusive. For some efforts with event data, see Hermann (1984), Goldstein and Freeman (1990), and Leng (1993a).

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